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Abstract
In the wake of urban riots and terror attacks in the United Kingdom, British public debate
and policy have focused on the nation's immigrant communities. These debates have commonly
called into question whether immigrant communities in Britain are sufficiently integrated into
"mainstream" society and included in the nation. These questions have been particularly focused
on the country’s immigrant Muslim communities because they have, over the years, been
accused of segregating themselves from, and within, British society. This study explored the
local and national identities of young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, which is one of
the largest Muslim communities in Britain. National identity is commonly thought to be
predicated upon equality, but there is limited empirical data to support the theory. Through
survey-based research, this study adds a layer of data to support the theory as it found young
British South Asian Muslims were more likely to identify with the nation if they felt as if they
were equal members of society, thought they had equal access to education, or thought British
South Asians had equal access to education. This study also explored the educational priorities
of the Muslim community because it has struggled to attain a high rate of educational
qualifications. This study found the educational goals of British South Asian Muslims differed
from those of the White British population. These differing priorities may further explain the
communities’ educational qualifications gap. As such, this study offers valuable insight for
policy makers and educators as they consider consumer demands while allocating scarce
resources in the city’s education sector.
Keywords: Islam, Bradford, UK, Muslim identity, British identity, Education
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Chapter 1 Introduction
In the wake of the 2001 urban riots in northern England, as well as the July 7, 2005 terror
attack in London, British public debate and policy have often focused on the nation's immigrant
communities (Peach 2006; Phillips 2006; Githens-Mazer 2008; Shaw 2002; Thomas and
Sanderson 2011). These debates have commonly called into question whether immigrant
communities in Britain are sufficiently integrated into "mainstream" society and included in the
nation - simply put, are they "British"? These questions have been particularly pointed at
Muslim immigrants because they have, over the years, been accused of segregating themselves
from British society (Shaw 2002; Phillips 2006).
One of the Muslim communities frequently accused of segregating itself is the South
Asian Muslim community in Bradford, West Yorkshire. With a quarter of the Metropolitan
District being Muslim, Bradford has one of Britain's largest Muslim communities, and was the
scene of some of the worst urban riots in 2001. In July 2001, two days of rioting there injured
326 police officers and 14 members of the public. The riots involved as many as 500 individuals
and caused up to £10 million of property damage (Hussain and Bagguley 2005). Government
inquiries into the cause of the riots, which also occurred in nearby Burnley and Oldham,
concluded racial segregation had been a contributing factor. The Home Office's report on the
riots, for example, concluded, "many [of these] communities operate on the basis of a series of
parallel lives. These lives often do not seem to touch at any point, let alone overlap and promote
any meaningful interchanges"(Home Office 2001).
This conclusion was echoed ten years later by Prime Minister David Cameron who
argued state multiculturalism had created a society that "encouraged different cultures to live
separate lives, apart from each other and the mainstream" (New Statesman 2011). In a February
2011 speech at the Munich Security Conference, Cameron claimed multiculturalism in Britain
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had failed because it allowed a segment of the British Muslim community to segregate itself
from "mainstream" society. He argued the breakdown of a common sense of British national
identity had also contributed to Islamist extremism and "home grown" terror. To counter
extremism, Cameron argued stronger British and local identities were needed to promote "true
cohesion" in society.
Driven by these public concerns for the integration and national identity of British
Muslims, this study sought to determine whether they identified with the nation. As alluded to
by Cameron, a shared national identity is thought to promote social solidarity and cohesion
(Jelen 2011). According to social theorists like Deutsch (1964), national identity is fostered by
equality; however, immigrants, including those in Bradford, are commonly disadvantaged
members of society. For example, 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households in the UK live
in poverty, compared to 20% of White British households (Modood 2006). In Bradford, the
Muslim community is particularly disadvantaged in the areas of education and employment.
According to the 2001 Census, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had no
educational or vocational qualifications, and nearly a third (30.3%) of all Muslim adults had
never worked or were long-term unemployed (Office for National Statistics 2001c). The 2001
Home Office inquiry into the urban rioting also highlighted the Muslims' low level of
qualifications and concluded educational opportunities in Bradford had been far from equal.
Peach (2006) has argued some British Muslims feel excluded from society because of their poor
socioeconomic conditions. This study sought to determine whether the community's very
identification with the nation has also been affected by how they perceive this inequality.
Given the Muslims' low level of qualifications, this study also sought to explore their
educational priorities and whether they felt like they were able to achieve them. At the national
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level, Modood (2006) has demonstrated ethnic minorities, including Pakistanis, are more likely
than white students to enter into higher education. In 2001, the likelihood of a white student
entering into higher education was 38%, while the likelihood for a Pakistani student was 49%.
However, Modood found ethnic Pakistani students were less likely to enter prestigious
universities and less likely to get high grade degrees. Modood also found Pakistani students,
most of whom are Muslim, were the most likely to leave school without qualifications (Modood
2006).
While this has been demonstrated at the national level, this study sought to determine
whether Muslim students in Bradford felt like they had equal access to education, and whether
they were able to achieve the educational goals that were most important to them. The inability
of British Muslims in Bradford to meet some of their demands in the education sector has, in the
past, led to feelings of injustice and rejection. This study sought to determine whether education
is an area of public life where the city's Muslim community continues to feel it is being
discriminated against.
Lastly, this study explored the acculturation strategies of young British South Asian
Muslims. According to Berry (1997), immigrants can adopt one of four acculturation strategies
when interacting with others in their host society. Depending upon how immigrants value
interaction with the new society and the maintenance of their own cultural identities, they can
choose one of the following strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalization.
For example, Robinson's (2009) study of adolescents in Birmingham and Leicester found young
Pakistani Muslims most commonly pursued segregation. While this is in keeping with the
charge that British Muslims segregate themselves from society, Phillips (2006) claims British
Muslims in Bradford are eager to better integrate into British society. To test Phillips' claim, this
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study explored the local, regional, and national identities of young Muslims in Bradford to
determine whether they were more likely to show signs of segregation or integration.
Academically, this study adds to the growing literature on immigration, acculturation,
and national identity. It also adds empirical data to the theory that equality promotes national
identity, which is important because Shulman (2003) has argued there is little data to support the
commonly accepted theory. The findings of this study suggest the majority of young British
South Asian Muslims in Bradford have successfully integrated into British society as they
readily identify with the nation. Nevertheless, a sizable minority has not; and based upon the
community's educational priorities identified in this study, Muslims in Bradford may integrate
less in the future.
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Chapter 2 Previous Research
To establish the academic foundation for this study, this chapter briefly highlights the
following topics: the 'nation' and national identity; national identity and international migration;
and lastly, acculturation. This chapter also provides some historical background on immigration
to Britain and the establishment of the South Asian community in Britain. Finally, this chapter
explores the socioeconomic conditions of the South Asian community in Bradford, with a
particular focus on the Pakistani Muslim population.
2.1 The Nation and National Identity
The 'Nation'
In its simplest form, a nation is a political community attached to a geographically bound
territory. The attachment to the land can be either physical or emotional. Theorists, however,
have struggled to more objectively define the nation. Hugh Seton-Watson, a leading scholar of
nationalism, concluded after a lifetime of study that a purely scientific definition could not be
produced (Anderson 2006). Although scholars have struggled to objectively define the nation,
Hutchinson and Smith (1994) claim the descriptions of it put forward by Renan, Stalin, and
Weber represent the broad views held within the discipline.
Ernest Renan and the Nation: "An Everyday Plebiscite"
The nation, argued Renan in a Parisian lecture hall in 1882, is "a soul, a spiritual
principle" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). In his lecture, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?, Renan claimed
the nation can be unified by a common language and shared interests. He also noted the historic
role played by a common ethnicity or religion in unifying tribes or small political bodies like the
Greek city-states. However, he argued these traits alone do not define the modern nation. Renan
claimed the modern nation is, above all else, a product of common history and the shared desire
of a people to form a collective; as he argued:
5

A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Only two things, actually, constitute this soul,
this spiritual principle. One is in the past, the other is in the present. One is the
possession in common of a rich legacy of remembrances; the other is the actual consent,
the desire to live together, the will to continue to value the heritage which all hold in
common... To have common glories in the past, a common will in the present; to have
accomplished great things together, to wish to do so again, that is the essential condition
for being a nation. (Hutchinson and Smith 1994)
United by a common heritage, even an imagined history, the key to the nation, according to
Renan, is the willingness of a people to participate in it. Renan claimed, "[The nation] supposes
a past, it renews itself especially in the present by a tangible deed: the approval, the desire,
clearly expressed, to continue the communal life. The existence of a nation (pardon this
metaphor!) is an everyday plebiscite" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Renan's views are akin to
the right of self-determination that carried significant weight during the early 20th century,
particularly in the creation of new nation-states following World War I.
Joseph Stalin and the Nation: A Community of People with a Common Language,
Territory, and Economy
Stalin defined the nation as an "historically constituted, stable community of people,
formed on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up
manifested in a common culture" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). To constitute a nation, Stalin
argued, each of these traits had to be present. To illustrate this requirement, he pointed to the
British and Americans. Despite sharing a common language, heritage, and, for a time, national
identity, the two ultimately became independent nations because they did not share a common
territory. Stalin argued the nation requires the extended cohabitation of a people on the land, as
he claimed, "a nation is formed only as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result
of people living together generation after generation" (Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Stalin's
prerequisite for sustained cohabitation has implications for international migrants because it
implies the first immigrant generations are not part of the nation.
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Max Weber and the Nation: A Community of Sentiment
According to Weber, the nation cannot be defined in empirical terms because nations are
ultimately tied to prestige, cultural values, and communal solidarity. Although he asserts a
common anthropological type can be relevant to nationality, Weber argues nations are not
necessarily based upon a common race, ethnicity, or religion - though these elements can unify
the community. Weber identified the nation as a "community of sentiment" linked to a legend of
a "providential mission" or destiny, and distinguished from others by its unique cultural values.
He writes, "The significance of the 'nation' is usually anchored in the superiority, or at least the
irreplaceability, of the culture values that are to be preserved and developed only through the
cultivation of the peculiarity of the group"(Hutchinson and Smith 1994). According to Weber, it
is the responsibility of the nation's members, particularly the intellectuals, to preserve and
cultivate the cultural values which distinguish the nation from others.
National Identity
National identity is one’s moral and emotional identification with the nation, and has
been described as the “social glue” that binds the nation together (Mortimer and Fine 1999;
Tilley and Heath 2007; Jelen 2011). Parekh writes, "National identity is about whether we
identify with a community, see it as ours, are attached to it and feel bonded to our fellow
members in a way in which we are not bonded to outsiders" (Mortimer and Fine 1999).
According to Parekh, national identity creates the sense of belonging and social solidarity that
unifies members of the nation and allows them to see past their differences. Likewise, Loden
(2008) claims shared national identity promotes cohesion by reducing in-group bias amongst the
nation's subgroups. As this is the case, national identity is more than a mere passive
identification with the nation, national identity actively sustains it.
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National Identity Promoted by Symbolism, Economic Advantage, and Equality
Because shared national identity fosters social harmony, the nation's powerbrokers
commonly strive to promote it amongst the population. In the view of Renan, it is the role of the
intellectuals to promote national identity. However, these efforts can also be the function of the
state, and are commonly undertaken in cooperation with social institutions, including national
educational systems (Marginson 2002; Hobsbawm 1992). In 2010, for example, the French
government mandated that a copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, a
symbol of French national identity, be placed in every French classroom. The government's
intent was to promote French national identity in response to the country's growing immigrant
population (Willsher 2010).
As attempted in France, states and national powerbrokers often appeal to symbolism to
foster national identity. Symbols have long been used as "devices" to promote or reify national
identity, and can include anthems, flags, currency, architecture, documents, flora, and fauna
(Jelen 2011). In addition to a copy of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, the
2010 French mandate required every classroom display a French flag. This is an example of
what Billig (1995) termed "banal nationalism", or the everyday evocation of nationalism through
the use of symbols like flags. For example, the Stars and Stripes is an omnipresent unifying
symbol of American national identity, as Samuel P. Huntington writes:
Since the Civil War, Americans have been a flag-oriented people. The Stars and Stripes
has the status of a religious icon and is a more central symbol of national identity for
Americans than their flags are for peoples of other nations. Probably never in the past,
however, was the flag as omnipresent as it was after September 11. It was everywhere:
homes, businesses, automobiles, clothes, furniture, windows, storefronts, lampposts,
telephone poles. In early October, 80 percent of Americans said they were displaying the
flag, 63 percent at home, 29 percent on clothes, 28 percent on cars. Wal-Mart reportedly
sold 116,000 flags on September 11 and 250,000 the next day, compared with 6,400 and
10,000 on the same days a year earlier.... The flags were physical evidence of the sudden
and dramatic rise in the salience of national identity for Americans compared to their
8

other identities. (Huntington 2004)
Observing the role symbolism plays in fostering national identity, Parekh writes, “Symbols play
an important part in nurturing and vivifying national identity. They are symbols of our
community, and not any other, and give it an unmistakable and tangible presence. They integrate
us into the life of our community and link us to its past and future” (Mortimer and Fine 1999).
In addition to symbolism, national identity can also be fostered by appeals to material
benefit. Karl Deutsch, for example, argued “images of the community” are formed when social
interactions, which he termed as transactions, lead to rewards; as he writes:
If these [social] transactions were rewarded, the image of a community may be strongly
positive. Liking this kind of community, people may say: We belong together. In their
favorable reaction to the community, they might then also say, I can see myself as a
member of this community; I will call it “we” if I speak of a group. I will call it “home”
if I speak of a territory. I will express and experience love of country (patriotism) or love
of a group of people (nationalism), but in any case I identify with this symbol or this
group. What is done to this country or to this group or to its symbol, such as the flag, is
done to me. I feel diminished or enlarged, depending on the diminution or enlargement
of this country or this group. (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964)
According to Deutsch, national identity is promoted when individuals think their membership in
the nation yields economic advantage. An example of this was the adoption of a common British
identity following the creation of Great Britain in 1707. Despite the longstanding animosity and
distrust between the English, Welsh, and Scottish, the three nations ultimately adopted a
common British identity because access to the British Empire gave them economic advantage
(Colley 2009).
Not only does the nation need to offer its members economic advantage to foster national
identity, but, according to Deutsch, it needs to do so equitably. Deutsch argues the uneven
distribution of benefits diminishes political integration and national identity, as he writes,
“Where wealth distributions are so skewed that only a small percentage of the population
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receives a large percentage of the nation’s wealth, social conflict and disintegrative tendencies
also usually exist” (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964). In Deutsch’s
opinion, it is the responsibility of the state to ensure the equal distribution of benefits – be they
economic, educational, social, or cultural.
According to Shulman (2003), scholars commonly accept Deutsch’s dual arguments that
economic advantage and equality foster national identity. However, Shulman argues there is
little empirical evidence to support these theories. In his own study, Shulman concluded the
economic strength of a nation, or equality within it, do not necessarily translate to a stronger
national identity. One of the primary hypothesizes Shulman tested was the claim that wealthier
members of the nation would have a stronger attachment to it because the nation had “served
them better economically”(Shulman 2003). His study concluded, however, that poorer members
of the nation were slightly more likely than wealthier members to identity with the nation.
Although wealth was a poor indicator of national attachment, his study concluded factors like
ethnicity, education, and age each had greater influence upon one’s attachment to the nation
(Shulman 2003). As such, he noted the need for scholars to further investigate the links between
ethnicity, economic inequality, and national identity.
2.2 National Identity and International Migration
The 20th and 21st centuries have been marked by high rates of international migration.
As of 2010, approximately 3.1% of the world's population were considered international
migrants, defined as those living outside the country of their birth (United Nations Population
Division 2013). However, the world's international migrant population is not evenly distributed,
and is concentrated in the more developed nations. According to the United Nations Population
Division, 60% of the world's international migrant population lives in Europe, North America,
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Australia, New Zealand, and Japan (United Nations Population Division 2013).
In response to the high level of international migration, scholars have begun to examine
its impact on national identity. Some, like Wright (2011), have questioned whether the high level
of international migration threatens the social harmony that is derived from a common sense of
national identity. Others, like Jelen (2011), have argued national identity itself is threatened by
the increasing number of people who consider themselves "stateless", including refugees,
international students, travelers, and laborers who frequently cross national boundaries.
Likewise, Weaver (1993) has expressed the concern that the high level of international migration
threatens "societal security", or the "ability of a society to persist in its essential character"
(Huntington 2004). Echoing Weaver's concerns, Huntington (2004) argues international
migration is the greatest threat to "societal security" as he claims it was responsible for the
erosion of American national identity before 9/11. Huntington argues American national identity
had given way to other identities that had become more salient at the end of the 20th century, as
he writes:
Among some educated and elite Americans, national identity seemed at times to have
faded from sight. Globalization, multiculturalism, cosmopolitanism, immigration,
subnationalism, and anti-nationalism had battered American consciousnesses. Ethnic,
racial, and gender identities came to the fore. In contrast to their predecessors, many
immigrants were ampersands, maintaining dual loyalties and dual citizenships. A
massive Hispanic influx raised questions concerning America's linguistic and cultural
unity... The national unity and sense of national identity created by work and war in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and consolidated in the world wars of the twentieth
century seemed to be eroding. By 2000, America was, in many respects, less a nation
than it had been for a century. The Stars and Stripes were at half-mast and other flags
flew higher on the flagpole of American identities. (Huntington 2004)
Huntington was concerned that American national identity and its cultural underpinnings were
being challenged by the increasing member of immigrants from Latin America and Asia who, in
his assessment, favored separation over assimilation.
11

Immigrants as a "Threat"
In 1806, Napoleon's government submitted a series of twelve questions to the Assembly
of Jewish Notables that had been convened by the government. Among the questions posed to
the body were the following: 1. "In the eyes of Jews, are Frenchmen considered as their
brethren? Or are they considered as strangers?" and 2. "Do Jews born in France, and treated by
the laws as French citizens, consider France their country? Are they bound to defend
it?"(Bloomberg 2004). In response to the first set of questions, the Assembly affirmed the
national identity of French Jews, as it attested:
In the eyes of Jews, Frenchmen are their brethren, and are not strangers... How could they
consider them otherwise when they inhabit the same land, when they are ruled and
protected by the same government, and by the same laws? When they enjoy the same
rights, and have the same duties to fulfill? There exists, even between the Jew and
Christian, a tie which abundantly compensates for religion - it is the tie of gratitude. This
sentiment was at first excited in us by the mere grant of toleration. It has been increased,
these eighteen years, by new favors from government, to such a degree of energy, that
now our fate is irrevocably linked the common fate of all Frenchmen. (Bloomberg 2004)
To the second set of questions, the Jewish body acknowledged the community had, for a time,
enjoyed fewer rights under French law, but they maintained their love for the nation regardless;
as the Assembly responded:
The love of the country is in the heart of Jews a sentiment so natural, so powerful, and so
consonant to their religious opinions, that a French Jew considers himself in England, as
among strangers, although he may be among Jews; and the case is the same with English
Jews in France. (Bloomberg 2004)
Pleased with these responses, Napoleon continued his policies of extending equal rights under
the law to Jews in the French Empire.
As in Napoleonic France, immigrants today are commonly viewed as a threat, and
sometimes, as in the case of Jews in France, as a potential fifth column. Writing of the often
hostile relationship between the host nation and immigrants, Triandafyllidou claims, "There is
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virtually no record of an immigrant population that is perceived by the host nation as an inspiring
Significant Other. The negative and threatening representation of the immigrant seems to be an
intrinsic feature of the host-immigrant relationship"(Delanty and Kumar 2006). While it may be
an "intrinsic feature" of the relationship, the threatening representation of the immigrant is
amplified following outbreaks of public disorder and violence involving immigrant communities.
This occurred in Britain, for example, after the urban riots in 2001. It has also occurred after
terrorist attacks and high profile anti-government demonstrations involving British Muslims. For
example, the far-right British Nationalist Party (BNP) vilified the Muslim community as a fifth
column following a provocative 2010 Remembrance Day protest in London. During the day's
customary moment of silence, a small group of young British Muslims burned poppies - the
symbol of Remembrance Day - while chanting "British Troops burn in hell!” Responding to the
protest, the BNP posted on its website under the heading Islamic Fifth Column in Britain, "The
justifiable outrage over the incident, which was clearly designed to insult all British people
honouring the dead in all wars, has hidden a host of other incidents which clearly show that antiBritish sentiment runs very high across the entire Islamic community in Britain" (British
Nationalist Party 2011). The protest also drew the criticism of the mainstream media. The Daily
Mail reported, "Three miles across London from the Armistice Day ceremony at the Cenotaph,
another face of Britain was on display. It was contorted with hatred, poisoned by politics, and
fuelled by flames from a giant, burning poppy. These were the Muslim extremists who brought
shame to the memory of the dead" (Harris 2010). Like other mainstream outlets, the Daily Mail
distinguished the actions of the minority as extremists, but the demonstration still cast a shadow
over the wider Muslim community in Britain.
Although immigrants are commonly seen as a threat, the British Muslim community has
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faced additional scrutiny because of the security threat posed by a minority. In 2011, British
intelligence officials estimated there were at least 200 British Muslims actively planning suicide
operations in the United Kingdom (Rayment 2011). Moreover, since 2001, British Muslim
immigrants have conducted five notable terror attacks in the UK, and have been implicated in at
least ten major plots or attempted attacks (see Appendix A). According to Thomas and
Sanderson (2011), the number of terror attacks and plots demonstrate the nation faces a real
threat from "home grown" Islamist terrorists.
Because of the security threat posed by British Islamist extremists, the national identity of
all British Muslims is ever present in the national headlines and as a topic of political debate
(Thomas and Sanderson 2011). This is partly due to the fact that some of the British Muslims
who have been involved in "home grown" terrorism have demonstrated a weak identification
with the nation, instead identifying with the 'umma, or global Muslim community. For example,
the ringleader of the July 7, 2005 attack in London seemed to identify more strongly with
Muslims outside Britain than with other Britons. With a thick Yorkshire accent, the secondgeneration immigrant Mohammad Sidique Khan claimed in his "martyr's" video:
Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my
people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just
as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters.
Until we feel security, you will be our targets. And until you stop the bombing, gassing,
imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I
am a soldier. (Italics added for emphasis) (BBC News 2005)
One of the attackers in the May 2013 murder of British soldier Drummer Lee Rigby made a
similar statement in the immediate aftermath of his attack. Michael Adebolajo, a British-born
Muslim convert of Nigerian descent, told onlookers, "We will never stop fighting you. The only
reasons we have done this is because Muslims are dying every day. This British soldier is an eye
for an eye, a tooth for tooth. We apologize that women had to see this today but in our lands our
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women have to see the same. You people will never be safe" (italics added for emphasis)
(Hjelmgaard and Stranglin 2013).
National Identities of Immigrants
Contemporary studies and social commentary on national identity and immigration are
focused around the intertwined questions: 1. Do immigrants identify with their host nation? and
2. What factors promote their ability to integrate into society? These questions are more than
academic. For one, immigrants who integrate into society have higher self-esteem, are more
competent in their work performance, and achieve higher academic standards (Phinney et al.
2001). Phinney (2001) also argues the immigrants' attachment to the nation promotes social
cohesion, which is what the Conservative Government in the UK hopes to achieve through better
integrating the nation's Muslim immigrant communities.
According to Berry (1997), immigrants arrive in a new country with differing views on
the value of retaining their own cultural identities and adopting those of the host nation. Based
upon how these different values intersect, Berry argues immigrants adopt one of four
acculturation strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or marginalization. These
differing strategies are represented in Figure 2-1. If an immigrant considers it of value to
maintain relations with the host society, and the host nation is receptive to immigrants and is
open to cultural diversity, the immigrant will likely integrate or assimilate. Alternatively,
immigrants who do not value relations with the host society will either pursue a strategy of
separation or marginalization depending on how they value the maintenance of their own cultural
identities. Phinney et al. (2001) argue integration is the best strategy for the immigrant's wellbeing, while marginalization is the worst strategy. For example, immigrant adolescents who
integrate or adopt a "bicultural orientation" perform better in schools than those immigrants who
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adopt other acculturation strategies.
Although it is thought integration is the best acculturation strategy for immigrants, fusing
multiple identities is not easy. For example, Indian-American author, Jhumpa Lahiri described
the difficulties she faced trying to balance multiple, and at times competing, identities; as she
writes:
When I was growing up in Rhode Island in the 1970s I felt neither Indian nor American.
Like many immigrant offspring I felt intense pressure to be two things, loyal to the old
world and fluent in the new, approved of on either side of the hyphen...my perception as a
young girl was that I fell short at both ends, shuttling between two dimensions that had
nothing to do with one another. (Facing History and Ourselves Foundation 2008)
While it can be difficult for immigrants to reconcile multiple identities, studies suggest multiple
factors that increase the likelihood an immigrant will successfully integrate into society. These
factors include a common language and the absence of discrimination (Robinson 2009; Phinney
et al. 2001; Loden 2008).
A common language is generally seen as a fundamental building block of the nation
(Smith 1991; Hutchinson and Smith 1994). Despite Huntington's (2004) concern that
immigrants increasingly maintain their own language instead of learning the language of their
host nation, studies suggest immigrants continue to see learning the host language as an
important entryway to full participation with the nation. For example, the 1994 General Social
Survey in the United States found more than 85% of Hispanics in the national survey saw
speaking English as being "very" or "fairly important" in making someone a "true American"
(Citrin et al. 2007). The 2002 Pew National Hispanic Survey also found Hispanics
overwhelmingly believed learning English was essential to succeeding in America (Citrin et al.
2007). Loden's (2008) study of national identity amongst secondary school students in Sweden
concluded Swedes and immigrants alike agreed the ability to speak Swedish was an important
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(Berry 1997)
Figure 2-1: Immigrant Acculturation Strategies According to Berry
step in becoming a "real Swede".
Equality, or at least the absence of overt discrimination, has also been identified as a
determining factor in the success of an immigrant's acculturation. Loden (2008), for example,
concluded in his study that "fair chances to establish oneself as a full member of society" was
essential to the immigrants' subsequent identification with the nation. Robinson's (2009) study
of Hindu and Muslim students in Britain likewise found perceptions of discrimination affected
the immigrants' acculturation strategy. Robinson concluded discrimination was reported less
frequently from those adolescents who pursued integration than from those who adopted
separation as an acculturation strategy.
2.3 Britain: A Legacy of Migration
Responding to the xenophobic criticisms of King William III, Daniel Defoe wrote in
1701:
The Romans first with Julius Cæsar came,
Including all the nations of that name,
Gauls, Greek, and Lombards; and, by computation,
Auxiliaries or slaves of ev'ry nation.
With Hengist, Saxons; Danes with Sweno came,
In search of plunder, not in search of fame.
Scots, Picts, and Irish from th' Hibernian shore;
And conq'ring William brought the Normans o'er.
All these their barb'rous offspring left behind,
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The dregs of armies, they of all mankind;
Blended with Britons, who before were here,
Of whom the Welch ha' blest the character.
From this amphibious, ill-born mob began,
That vain ill-natured thing, an Englishman.
(Defoe 1870)
As encapsulated by Defoe in his satirical poem, The True-Born Englishman, England - and by
extension Britain - is a nation of migrants. Some of the earliest immigrants arrived in the form
of invading armies, introducing the likes of the Angles, Saxons, Danes, and Normans to Britain
(Layton-Henry 1992). Others immigrated to Britain as refugees, escaping either religious or
political persecution. These settlers included French Protestants in the 17th century and Eastern
European Jews in the 19th and 20th centuries. Some of the more recent immigrants moved to
Britain for economic reasons. For example, immigrants from the West Indies and South Asia
migrated in response to Britain’s labor shortages in the middle of the twentieth century. Their
immigration was also a legacy of Britain’s colonial history.
In addition to a long history of immigration, Britain has been a considerable source of
emigration over the centuries. The British emigrated for many of the same reasons that
immigrants settled in Britain, including economic gain, refuge from religious or political
persecution, and Britain’s colonial policies. Pushing aside initial concerns that Europeans who
settled in foreign lands would lose their civility, the British became the leading colonizers of
North America, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa (Earle 1992; Erickson 1989).
Although the recent levels of immigration to Britain have drawn significant public
attention, historically, the level of British emigration outpaced the volume of immigration.
Figure 2-2 depicts the net migration to Britain between 1871 and 1940, while Figure 2-3
represents net migration between 1951 and 1988. As seen in these figures, annual emigration
has exceeded immigration for most of the last 140 years. Even in the 1930s when immigration
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briefly surpassed the rate of emigration, many of the immigrants were in fact British citizens
returning to Britain after having failed to establish themselves abroad (Layton-Henry 1992).
Only in the last three decades has the annual rate of immigration consistently surpassed
the level of emigration. Figure 2-4 represents net migration to Britain between 1964 and 2011.
Between 1964 and 1987, net migration totaled -842,000 and the annual number of immigrants
exceeded the number of emigrants only six times. In contrast, net migration between 1988 and
2011 equaled 2.3 million and the annual number of immigrants outnumbered emigrants 21 times
(Hawkins 2013). The increased level of immigration to Britain in recent decades is consistent
with trends observed elsewhere in Western Europe as countries that once sent migrants out into
the world have since become "immigrant receiving societies" (Massey et al. 1993).
Notwithstanding the historical presence of minorities in Britain and the continued
presence of a large ethnic majority, recent immigration has reshaped the country's human
landscape. In 1991, the white population represented 94.1% of the total population in England
and Wales. Ten years later, the white population represented 91.3% of the population, and in
2011, it represented 86% of the population (National Statistics 2006; Office for National
Statistics 2013d). The decreasing proportion of whites in England and Wales is due in part to
weak natural population growth. Between 1991 and 2011, the white population grew by just one
percent (Office for National Statistics 2013d; National Statistics 2006).
By contrast, the non-white population in England and Wales, particularly the South Asian
population, has grown rapidly in recent decades because of immigration and natural population
growth. In 1991, South Asians represented 2.9% of the overall population of England and
Wales; in 2011, they represented 5.3% (National Statistics 2006; Office for National Statistics
2013d). Between 1991 and 2011, the ethnic Indian population grew by 65%, the Pakistani
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Figure 2-2: Net Migration to Britain, 1871-1940
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Figure 2-3: Net Migration to Britain, 1951-1988
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Figure 2-4: Net Migration to Britain, 1964-2011
population by 140%, and the Bangladeshi population by 168% (National Statistics 2006; Office
for National Statistics 2013d).
The transformation of Britain from an emigrant sending nation to an "immigrant
receiving society" has produced a strong public reaction. A poll conducted in June 2013 by
Ipsos-MORI highlighted the widespread public concern with recent levels of immigration. The
annual survey found that after the economy, the second most important issue facing Britons was
race relations/immigration. While 50% of respondents said the economy was the most important
issue facing Britain, 35% claimed the most important issue was race relations/immigration
(Economist 2013b). It has been claimed that the public's concern over recent immigration is
sharpened by the fact that many of the immigrants in the 20th century were former colonial
subjects (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). However, the concern is also tied to economic
considerations. An Ipsos-MORI survey in April 2013 found 55% of British respondents thought
the level of immigration had to be solved to end the country's economic crisis (Economist
2013b).
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The public's concern with immigration is also reflected in government policy.
Immigration control, for example, has been a cornerstone of the Conservative Government's
agenda. In addition to pledging to reduce annual net migration to the tens of thousands, the
government has made the integration of immigrant communities a priority. In an April 2011
speech to the Conservative Party, Cameron argued new immigration controls were necessary to
better integrate new immigrants into British society and to relieve the pressure that recent
immigrants had placed on society. In his address to the Conservative Party, Cameron argued:
Between 1997 and 2009, 2.2 million more people came to live in this country than left to
go and live abroad. That is the largest influx of people Britain as ever had and it has
placed real pressure on communities up and down our country. Not just pressure on
schools, housing and healthcare - though those have been serious - but social pressures
too. Because real communities aren't just collections of public service users living in the
same space. Real communities are bound by common experiences, forged by friendship
and by conversation; knitted together by all the rituals of the neighbourhood, from the
school run to the chat down the pub. And these bonds take time. And so real integration
takes time too. That's why, when there have been significant numbers of new people
arriving in neighbourhoods, perhaps not able to speak the same language as those living
there, on occasions not really wanting or even willing to integrate, that has created a kind
of discomfort and a disjointedness in some neighborhoods. (The Guardian 2011)
To reduce net migration and promote the integration of new immigrants, the Conservative-led
coalition government has since introduced policies which limit non-EU immigration, tighten
controls on student visa programs, and place greater emphasis on the need for immigrants to
speak English.
Government Efforts to Restrict Immigration to Britain
The Conservative Government's initiatives are the latest in a series of government efforts
to restrict immigration since the turn of the 20th century. A timeline of key events and efforts to
restrict immigration is found in Table 2-1. The timeline highlights the repeated concern for the
ability of immigrants to integrate or assimilate into British society, as well as the continued
concerns with non-European immigration.
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Each of the events in Table 2-1 were important in the development of immigration
controls in Britain. However, the intent here is to highlight the efforts to limit immigration at the
turn of the 20th century because of the parallels with Muslim immigrants today. Some of the
most visible migrants at the turn of the century were Jewish refugees who, like the Muslims
today, were distinctly different from the white majority because of their religious and cultural
markers. The panic over anarchist-linked migrants at the turn of the century also resembles the
contemporary fear of Islamist-linked immigrants. Indeed, government debates in the 1890s over
the right to deport anarchists bears striking semblance to the government efforts in the 21st
century to deport immigrants like Abu Qatada who are suspected of links to international
terrorism.
Jewish Immigrants at the Turn of the 20th Century
At the turn of the 20th century, persecution and pogroms in Eastern Europe and Russia
pushed a large number of Jewish migrants to the west. Although most of these settled in the
United States, many of them transited Britain. According to an account of the day, Britain was a
natural transit point for the Jewish refugees because of its geographic location and its dominance
of the world's sea trade (Anonymous1897). While most Jewish migrants travelled onto the
United States, some settled in Britain. Between 1875 and 1914, an estimated 120,000 Jewish
refugees chose to settle in Britain (Layton-Henry 1992).
While the Jewish community in Britain was relatively small, it did not go unnoticed
because successive waves of immigrants settled in relatively few places. Most immigrants were
attracted to London, in particular to East London. In 1901, the East London Borough of Stepney
was home to 40% of London's immigrant population (The National Archives n.d.). The spatial
concentration of immigrants spurred political movements opposed to their presence. For
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example, the Conservative Member of Parliament for Stepney, Sir William Evans-Gordon,
helped to form the anti-immigrant British Brothers' League. Established in 1901 as an antiimmigrant movement, it soon became associated with anti-Semitism. The movement's political
power was demonstrated the following year when the government responded to its pressure by
forming the Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evans-Gordon as a member of the
body. The Commission's recommendations led to the 1905 Aliens Act that gave the government
the power to refuse entry to destitute immigrants. However, the act also established the right of
asylum to those, like the Jewish immigrants, who could prove they were fleeing persecution.
The Anarchist Debates
Politicians like Evans-Gordon were opposed to immigration on the grounds that
immigrants posed a threat to the British working class. However, the House of Commons'
Committee on Emigration and Immigration (Foreigners) in 1889 had concluded the rate of
immigration was not sufficient enough to warrant legislation. Nevertheless, a crisis on the
continent in 1894 led Parliament to reexamine the issue. In June 1894, French President Marie
Carnot was assassinated by the Italian anarchist Santo Caserio. It was claimed in the press that
the assassin’s plot had been planned in England.
It was not the first time that England had been charged as being a safe haven for
anarchists. In February of 1894, a terror attack in Paris carried out by anarchist Émile Henry was
also reported to have been planned in England. After the attack, The Times reported parts of
London had become rife with Continental anarchists and their supporters. The Times also
claimed the material support for the attack had been provided in London, as it reported:
The district of Tottenham Court Road has long been notorious as the favourite domicile
of the most advanced section of the Socialist party and of the Anarchists, English and
foreign. In a street off this main thoroughfare is a club, known to the police for years past
as the resort of political desperadoes of all nationalities, wherein anarchy and the ‘Social
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Table 2-1
Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain
1889
A Select Committee of the House of Commons concluded newly established immigrant
communities led to localized overcrowding in major cities; however, the number of
immigrants was not large enough to warrant legislation.
1894
Political campaigns respond to Jewish immigration that had created large immigrant
settlements in East London. Prime Minister Lord Salisbury introduced a Bill to restrict
immigration.
1898
Lord Hardwicke's bill, which was similar to Lord Salisbury’s Bill of 1894, failed to pass
Parliament.
1901
Conservative Member of Parliament (MP) Evans-Gordon formed the British Brothers'
League, an anti-Jewish movement that campaigned against immigration.
1902
The government responds to pressure from the British Brothers' League by establishing the
Royal Commission on Alien Immigration, with Evans-Gordon a member. The Commission
concluded the immigrant population was not numerically significant and was as "healthy and
clean" as the British population. The Commission also concluded immigrant children were
able to adapt well in English schools after any deficiencies in language were overcome.
Nevertheless, the Commission recommended the government have the power to refuse entry
to 'undesirable' aliens.
1905
The Royal Commission’s recommendations led to the 1905 Aliens Act. The Act granted the
government the power to refuse entry to immigrants who could not financially support
themselves. The Act also firmly established the policy of asylum to those who could prove
they were fleeing religious or political persecution.
1914
The onset of WWI led the Liberal Government to pass the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914.
The Act gave the Home Secretary complete control over immigration and foreign residents
inside the country.
1919
The Aliens Restrictions (Amendment) Act of 1919 replaced the 1905 Aliens Act and extended
the 1914 Act by a year.
1920
The Aliens Order is passed giving the Home Secretary the authority to deport any immigrant
whose presence in Britain was not considered ‘conducive to the public good'. The law was
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Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain (continued)
renewed annually until the Immigration Act of 1971.
1947
After WWII, the government took pro-immigration initiatives to settle 120,000 Poles who
had served under British command during the war. The Polish Resettlement Act was passed
to assist Polish service members and their families to establish citizenship and permanent
residence in the Commonwealth.
1948
The Nationality Act of 1948 conferred British citizenship to all those who then lived within
the Empire and Commonwealth, giving them full access to live and work in Britain without
a visa.
The Empire Windrush, the first Caribbean migrant ship arrived in Britain. The Windrush
brought West Indian migrants on its return trip from delivering British emigrants to
Australia.
1949
The Royal Commission on Population, first established in 1944, reports the declining
fertility rate in Britain would lead to an economic downturn and decreased emigration. It was
feared these would reduce British influence in the world. However, the Commission
concluded large-scale immigration was impractical due to concerns over training and
housing immigrants. The Commission was also concerned with the immigrants’ ability to
assimilate.
1952
Between 1952-1957, Conservative MP Cyril Osborne carried out an anti-immigration
campaign in the House of Commons. Although he was not successful, his views on
restricting "colored immigration" were shared by many, including members of the cabinet.
However, it was not politically viable to restrict Commonwealth immigration because the
government was, at the time, actively promoting the image of a multiracial Commonwealth.
1958
Anti-minority riots in Nottingham and Notting Hill force the issue of immigration to the
fore. After the riots, the Daily Express published the results of a public opinion poll claiming
79.1% of national respondents favored controls of "colored immigration". Conservative MP
Martin Lindsey claimed, “We all know perfectly well that the core of the problem is
coloured migration. We must ask ourselves to what extent we want Great Britain to become
a multi-racial community … a question which affects the future of our own race and breed is
not one we should merely leave to chance” (Layton-Henry 1992).
1960
In an attempt to indirectly restrict immigration, the government tried to persuade colonial
and Commonwealth governments to unilaterally limit the issuance of passports to their
citizens. As an example of the pushback, the Indian Supreme Court ruled it was
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Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain (continued)
unconstitutional for the Indian government to refuse passports to its citizens.
1961
At the Conservative party's annual conference, 39 resolutions demanding immigration
controls were submitted for discussion. In October, the Queen announced the
Commonwealth Immigrants Bill.
1962
The Commonwealth Immigrants Bill became law on 1 July. The law enacted immigration
controls for all holders of Commonwealth passports, except those born in the UK or those
holding British passports. Holders of Commonwealth passports wishing to migrate to Britain
had to receive a work voucher through the Ministry of Labour. The voucher system gave
priority to those with either a job offer or those with high demand skills. According to
Layton-Henry, the Bill signaled a “decisive change in
British government policy and the break with the long tradition of treating all
Commonwealth and colonial people as British subjects with equal rights of citizenship,
including access to the UK as native Britons” (Layton-Henry 1992).
1964
In the wake of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill, race and immigration were key issues in
the General Elections. In election speeches in Bradford and Birmingham, Conservative
Prime Minister Sir Alec Douglas-Home boasted nearly a million would-be immigrants had
been excluded as a result of the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill. Harold Wilson, who
became Prime Minister in the election, accused the Conservatives of using immigration as an
excuse for their failures to address housing and education.
In Birmingham, Conservative Peter Griffiths pulled off a shock victory over Patrick Gordon
Walker who was expected to become Harold Wilson's foreign secretary. Griffith's campaign
benefited from an anti-immigrant campaign poster bearing the racially charged and offensive
slogan, "If you want a nigger for a neighbour, Vote Labour".
1965
As the number of minority immigrant students increased in the 1950s and 1960s, white
parents sought to limit their enrollment. In response to pressure, local authorities placed
quotas on the number of minority students allowed to enroll in a given school. In 1965, the
Department of Education and Science instituted a policy of busing minority immigrants from
the inner cities.
1968
Responding to the immigration of South Asians from East Africa, the Labour government,
under pressure from the Conservatives, issued the 1968 Immigration Act. The Act required
new immigrants to have sufficiently close connections to Britain, such as a parent or
grandparent born in Britain.
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Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain (continued)
1971
The 1971 Immigration Act was even more restrictive than the 1968 Immigration Act. The
act
allowed only those Commonwealth citizens whose father or grandparents were born in the
UK,
or were previously naturalized and living in the UK, to enjoy an automatic right of abode.
Other Commonwealth citizens could only immigrate if they had a work permit for a specific
job with a known employer.
2002
The Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act introduced the Life in the UK Test for those
seeking naturalization or permanent settlement in the UK. The test was intended to test the
applicant's English skills and knowledge of "British life".
2010
The Coalition government under Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron promised to
cut net migration from 196,000 to "tens of thousands". The government introduced a cap on
the level of skilled laborers who could enter Britain from non-EU countries.
(BBC News 2010; Brown 2001; Brah 2008; House of Lords and House of Commons Join
2009; Peach 2006; Layton-Henry 1992)
Table 2-1: Timeline of Key Events and Efforts to Regulate Immigration to Britain
Revolution’ are preached. Some time ago the frequency of the visits paid by some of the
leading frequenters of the club to a house in another street leading off Tottenham Court
Road, and the fact that a number of French and Spanish Anarchists had taken up their
residence in the same building, led to a special and very careful watch being kept on the
place. It was speedily discovered that the suspected men were in frequent
communications with the leading Continental Anarchists, and, as a matter of fact, as it is
now known, the latest bomb-thrower, Emile Henry, was in the house only a few weeks
ago. There is also reason to believe that he obtained from fellow-conspirators in this
house the ingredients and material with which to manufacture the infernal machine which
he threw with such terrible effect in the Café Terminus in Paris. (Great Britain Parliament
1892)
Lord Salisbury used this report to justify the introduction of his Aliens Bill before the House of
Lords in July of 1894.
Lord Salisbury's legislation sought in part to grant the government the power to expel
known anarchists from the country; however, the bill also sought government powers to restrict
the entry of destitute immigrants. Lord Salisbury argued the bill was necessary to safeguard
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Britain’s working class population, as he claimed destitute immigrants had increased the burden
on the tax payer through increased poor rates (Steele 2001). He also appealed to the principles of
supply and demand in the labor force, arguing the increased presence of migrants made it more
difficult for working class British citizens to find work. During the second reading of the bill,
Lord Salisbury argued:
[The immigrants] diminish the chances of earning a livelihood which your own
population feels so much. Their difficulty of finding employment is increasing more and
more, the number of those who are seeking public relief gets greater and greater, and
there is a very general belief among working men, and I think that belief is founded upon
facts, that the introduction of these aliens, who are content with the very lowest
conditions of existence, has a tendency to drive our own population out of employment
and to increase the hardness of that battle which they have to fight in finding the means
of living. (Great Britain Parliament 1892)
According to Salisbury, it was incumbent upon the government to restrict immigration to limit
the competition faced by British workers in the labor market.
In the final decades of the 19th century, other countries had enacted restrictions similar to
those proposed by Lord Salisbury. For example, the United States had passed the Immigration
Act of 1891 which gave the government the authority to exclude “all idiots, insane persons,
paupers or persons likely to become a public charge, persons suffering from a loathsome or a
dangerous contagious disease, persons who have been convicted of a felony or other infamous
crime or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude”(Anonymous1891). Because of this, and
similar legislation elsewhere, Lord Salisbury claimed Britain would become the only country
open to receive the world's destitute if Parliament did not act. He argued the failure to act would
permanently disadvantage the country's working class.
Despite these arguments, Lord Salisbury's bill was not carried further than a second
reading. The bill was attacked by its opponents as a case of the "anti-alien party" capitalizing
upon a crisis in Europe to force anti-immigrant measures (The Speaker 1894). Opponents of the
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bill did not want to reverse Britain's traditional openness to immigrants. They also feared the
bill's passage would be a tacit admission that Britain had indeed been a “hot bed of conspiracy
against other countries”(The Speaker 1894). Those opposed to the bill were also unsatisfied with
the legislation's provision to expel those deemed as anarchists, fearing it would lead to
government overreach. They feared the Home Office would be inundated with requests to
extradite foreign dissenters who could be falsely labeled as anarchists. To illustrate this concern,
they argued the legislation would have led to the expulsion of the Italian nationalists who had
found refuge in Britain decades earlier, including Giuseppe Mazzini. The Earl of Cowper, who
opposed the bill, argued it would have forced the Home Secretary to consider foreign requests to
extradite Mazzini because he had been an advocate of political assassinations.
In Lord Salisbury's counter-argument, he claimed the Mazinni example was not
applicable. Lord Salisbury argued the anarchists posed a problem not previously faced in
history. Using an argument that could be mistaken for a present-day appeal to removing
international terrorist safe havens, Lord Salisbury argued:
My whole case is that everything has changed since the days of Kossuth, Mazzini, and
Garibaldi. It is no longer a case of liberty against despotism. It is no longer a question of
giving a harbor of safety to those who, in the vicissitudes of politics, have failed to carry
their own ideals into effect. You are now dealing with men for whom any such excuse is
impossible, and would be almost disgraceful. You are dealing with men who commit
crimes, which it is difficult to exceed by reference to any which history has recorded, and
which it would be difficult to exceed in any imagination that the power of poets or
romancers could portray. If you remain the only State from which they cannot be turned
out, by a mathematical law they must all come here. (Great Britain Parliament 1892)
Salisbury's argument did not convince his peers, who ultimately thought the anarchist threat and
level of immigration were insufficient to warrant rushed legislation. Those who held this view
were bolstered by the release of a report by the Board of Trade, which was published as the
Aliens Bill was before Parliament. The purpose of the Alien Bill was to curb the tide of destitute
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immigrants, but the report concluded immigration to Britain constituted more of a trickle. The
report concluded: 1. the number of immigrants had been exaggerated and paled in comparison to
both the number of emigrants and the total population; 2. there were relatively few destitute
immigrants who would be considered paupers; 3. contrary to the public opinion, the majority of
the immigrants were law-abiding, industrious people; and lastly, most immigrants quickly
assimilated into English society (Anonymous1897). The timing and conclusions of the report led
many Parliamentarians to dismiss out of hand the need to enact any controls on immigration.
2.4 South Asians in Britain
South Asian Immigration before World War II
There has been a South Asian presence in Britain since the 1600s, but settled
communities did not appear until the 19th century (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008; Peach 2006).
The earliest to settle were lascars, Asian sailors who, in 1924, constituted 17% of the British
merchant fleet (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). Working conditions at sea were difficult, and the
first Asian settlers were lascars who abandoned their ships while docked in Britain. As a result,
the first South Asian immigrant communities in Britain were located in the port cities of Cardiff,
Liverpool, and East London (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). Although early lascar settlers often
faced discrimination, they also found support from charities and missionary societies like the
Strangers’ Home for Asiatics in London that provided them with food and lodging as they
settled.
British labor shortages during World War I encouraged further South Asian immigration.
Despite government warnings against the hiring of lascars who abandoned their ships, companies
like Lever Brothers and John Walker and Tate heavily recruited them during the war (Ali, Kalra,
and Sayyid 2008). During the war, lascars continued to settle in industrial port cities, but South
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Asians also began to settle further inland as they found work in Britain's wartime munitions
factories (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). As a result, Asian settlements appeared in Sheffield and
Glasgow.
A depressed economy during the interwar years decreased the overall demand for labor
and discouraged further immigration. Moreover, to protect British workers, employers and the
British government introduced policies that excluded immigrants from whole segments of the job
market (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). However, not all industries were equally impacted by the
downturned economy. Emerging industries, including car and appliance manufacturing,
established new factories in the country’s interior. The establishment of these new industries
encouraged the relocation of South Asians from the docks to Britain’s interior, including the
Midlands.
Despite the reduced demand for labor, South Asians continued to settle in Britain during
the interwar period. High unemployment in India, as well as a downturn in Punjabi agriculture
encouraged South Asian emigration (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008). Changes in the shipping
industry also further encouraged lascar settlement. As ships switched from coal to oil-fired
power, the demand for South Asian workers in the labor-intensive boiler rooms decreased,
leading lascars to seek out new work on land (Spencer 1997). South Asian students also
continued to immigrate to Britain. On the subcontinent, a British education was viewed as an
invaluable opportunity for upward mobility, and in 1927, there were approximately 1,700 Indian
students in Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester, Liverpool, Sheffield, Leeds, and Bristol. Many of
these students settled in Britain after completing their degrees (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).
South Asian Immigration after World War II
The outbreak of World War II restored the demand for immigrant labor as many of the
factories established during the interwar years were retooled for the manufacture of munitions
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and war materiel. The demand for Asian lascars also rebounded as British mariners were called
to serve in the Royal Navy. As a result, the number of lascars nearly doubled during World War
II (Spencer 1997). However, as the lascars' ships were either given over to the war effort or
destroyed at sea, many of the lascars again found themselves out of work. Asian immigrants
during the war, including unemployed lascars, were directed by British authorities to seek work
at wartime factories in Bradford, Leeds, Birmingham, and Coventry (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid
2008).
Wartime labor demands encouraged immigration, but the mass migration and settlement
of South Asians in Britain did not occur until after World War II. Britain's growing economy
after the war required additional labor. At the same time, Britain's former colonies did not have
the means to make their labor forces fully productive. The result was migration from the
peripheries of the former Empire to Britain as its former colonies, particularly the New
Commonwealth, became a source of inexpensive labor (Ali, Kalra, and Sayyid 2008).
As seen in Figure 2-5, New Commonwealth immigration to Britain after the war was
initially dominated by Caribbean immigration. By the 1960s, however, the number of South
Asian immigrants to Britain dramatically increased. In contrast to Caribbean immigration, which
had been relatively gender-neutral, South Asian migration was, at first, largely undertaken by
males (Peach 2006). Attracted to Britain by higher wages, South Asian males immigrated to
Britain to support their families who often remained in India, Pakistan, or Bangladesh.
Initially, the workers did not see themselves as settlers, and their remittances were used to
build up estates, homes, and businesses in South Asia. The laborers' intent to not settle was
evidenced by their frugal living conditions in Britain, as most lived in domiciles shared by
multiple migrant workers (Cohen 1974). Most South Asian migrant laborers fully anticipated
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they would return to South Asia after the season of their labor in Britain was complete. Changes
to British immigration laws in the 1960s and 1970s, however, altered South Asian immigration
trends. As British subjects, prior to the introduction of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of
1962, South Asians were free to enter and leave Britain without restriction. However, the new
law, which was enacted in the summer of 1962, required holders of Commonwealth passports to
obtain vouchers from the Ministry of Labour before they could enter the UK. The new law,
which was unabashedly intended to reduce "coloured immigration", had the unintended
consequence of leading to a sharp increase in South Asian immigration. Migrant male laborers
who had initially planned to return to Asia, instead summoned their families to join them before
the law was enacted. In the 18 months prior to the enacting of the law, approximately 50,000
Pakistanis entered Britain, compared to the 17,000 who had entered between 1955 and 1960
(Shaw 1988).
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Figure 2-5: New Commonwealth-born Population of Britain, 1989-91
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"Push" Factors Contributed to South Asian Migration
British demand for labor after World War II was not the only factor that contributed to
South Asian immigration, as "push" factors in South Asia also contributed. For example, the
construction of the Mangla Dam in northern Pakistan during the 1960s led to a mass emigration
from Mirpur District. The Dam and Mangla Reservoir, which were created under the Indus
Water Treaty signed between India and Pakistan in 1960, immersed approximately 200 villages
and towns, including the district center. Over 65,000 acres of land were submersed, and up to
100,000 people were displaced as a result of the project, which was completed in 1967 (Kalra
2000). While some of those displaced relocated to the immediate surrounding area, others were
given land in the Punjab as compensation. A number of others, however, emigrated to Britain
with the money they received as compensation.
In the 1960s and 1970s, South Asians in East Africa were also compelled to emigrate,
and due to colonial ties, many migrated to Britain. In the late 19th century, Britain had recruited
Asian laborers as indentured servants to build the railroads in East Africa. When the East
African nations of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika gained their independence in the 1960s, the
nations’ South Asian populations, which were never fully incorporated into East African society,
were granted British citizenship and allowed to emigrate to Britain. In 1972, Idi Amin, then
President of Uganda, stripped the Asians of their Ugandan citizenship and expelled them from
the country; many of these also settled in Britain.
Patterns of South Asian Settlement in Britain
The initial South Asian settlements in Britain reflected the community’s lascar heritage as
the earliest communities were located in port cities like Cardiff, Liverpool, and London. These
first communities were small. In the first half of the 20th century, Cardiff was the largest center
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of Asian, African, and West Indian settlement, but there were fewer than 2,500 of these
minorities living there in 1930- and most of them were Arabs and Somalis (Spencer 1997). By
the middle of the 20th century, South Asian communities had expanded into Britain's interior as
industries and wartime factories required their labor. By the end of World War II, South Asian
communities were also located in Sheffield, Glasgow, Oxford, Cambridge, Manchester,
Bradford, Leeds, and Bristol.
At the beginning of the 21st century, Britain's South Asian communities are still
primarily concentrated in these same industrial cities (Peach 2006). A quarter of Britain's
Bangladeshi population lives in only one London district, in the Borough of Tower Hamlets.
Similarly, British Sikhs are largely concentrated in London, Birmingham, and Wolverhampton,
while Hindus are centered in London and Leicester. British Pakistanis, who are predominately
Muslim, are centered in London, Birmingham, Manchester, Bradford, Leeds, and Luton (Peach
2006).
South Asian communities are found in relatively few British cities, but they originated
from even fewer places. According to Peach (2006), 80% of the British Pakistani population
originated from either Mirpur District in Azad Kashmir or from the nearby Chhachh area in
Attock District (formerly known as Campbellpur District) in Punjab Province. Similarly, over
80% of the British Bangladeshi population emigrated from Sylhet District in Bangladesh, and
80% of British Sikhs came from Jullundur District in the Indian Punjab. Lastly, 70% of Indian
Hindus and Muslims came from the Indian state of Gujurat (Peach 2006).
The large number of immigrants from relatively few places is a factor of colonial ties,
physical geography, and chain migration. Figure 2-6 depicts the British Pakistanis' places of
origin. As noted above, over 80% of the British Pakistani community emigrated from Mirpur
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and Attock districts. The others came from Peshawar in Khyber Paktunkhwa Province and from
villages in the Punjabi districts of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Gujurat, and Faisalabad (Shaw 1988).
Mirpur and Attock districts had been a source of lascar laborers for Britain's merchant
fleet in the 19th and early 20th century. For example, laborers from the Chhach area in Attock
District commonly found employment in Bombay as stokers in the fleet's boiler rooms, as a 1907
edition of the Punjab District Gazetteer attested, "From the northeast corner of the Chhachh very
large numbers of men go out as stokers on the P. & O. and British India boats and come back
shattered in health, but full of money" (Cohen 1974). In the 19th century, Mirpur and Attock
were also primary sources of recruitment for the British Indian Army and Navy (Kalra 2000;
Shaw 1988).
In addition to these colonial ties, the physical terrain of northern Pakistan contributed to
the migration of Mirpuri and Chhachi males to Britain. In contrast to the center of Pakistan's
Punjab Province, which is arid but irrigated, the land in the north is rough, hilly, generally
underdeveloped, and dependent upon rainfall for agriculture. As a result, much of the land is not
cultivatable. According to Shaw (1988), these factors naturally predisposed males in northern
Pakistan to seek work outside of their home districts. Moreover, because primogeniture was not
practiced in Pakistan, the scarce land available for agriculture was divided into smaller plots with
each successive generation (Shaw 1988). This contributed to underemployment in the region
and applied pressure to the area's male population to find work elsewhere.
The geography of northern Pakistan predisposed the region's male population to migrate,
but the process of chain migration accounted for the relocation of near entire villages from
northern Pakistan to Britain. Mirpuri and Punjabi communities place particular emphasis upon
clan loyalty and the male networks of the extended family, or biradari (brotherhood) (Shackle
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2010). These networks played a key role in determining the patterns of immigration and
settlement in Britain. Once established with a job and housing, the first migrant workers assisted
others within their biradaris to immigrate, often helping them find initial work and housing. As
a result, Pakistani immigrant settlements in Britain tended to closely mirror their communities in
South Asia. For example, a study of the Pakistani community in Oxford discovered the majority
of its 2,000 members could be traced back to two immigrant chains, one of which began with a
single individual who immigrated to Glasgow during World War II (Spencer 1997). Chain
migration explains how British Pakistanis from Mirpur, Attock and Peshawar are centered in
Bradford, while British Pakistanis from Jhelum and Faisalabad are predominately found in
Oxford (Shaw 1988).
2.5 The South Asian Community in Bradford
There is not one South Asian community in Bradford; instead, there are multiple South
Asian communities divided by ethnicity, religion, and places of origin. According to the 2011
Census of England and Wales, there were 130,032 South Asians of Pakistani, Indian, or
Bangladeshi descent living in the City of Bradford Metropolitan District (see Table 2-2). 1 In
2011, the number of South Asians in Bradford equaled 24.9% of the district's overall population,
representing a significant growth since 2001(Office for National Statistics 2013d). In 2001,
there were 85,409 South Asians in Bradford, or 18.3% of the district's population at the time
(Office for National Statistics 2001a). This represented a 52.2% growth in ten years. By
contrast, the district's White British population decreased .9% during the same time (Office for
National Statistics 2001a; Office for National Statistics 2013d). The district's South Asian

1

The Metropolitan District includes Bradford and surrounding towns, including: Keighley
Shipley, Bingley, Ilkley, Haworth, Silsden, and Denholme.
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Figure 2-6: British Pakistanis' Places of Origin (Map)
population is centered in Bradford, where they constitute nearly four-tenths (39.7%) of the city's
population.2 Keighley is the district's other center of South Asian settlement, as seen in Figure 27. In 2011, South Asians represented 52.1% of the census ward Keighley Central (9,512 South
Asians/18,255 total residents) (Office for National Statistics 2013b).
2

Bradford includes the following census wards: Bolton and Undercliffe, City, Great Horton,
Little Horton, Clayton and Fairweather Green, Queensbury, Wibsey, Royds, Bowling and
Barkerend, Bradford Moor, Thornton and Allerton, Toller, Heaton, Manningham, and Tong.
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All Usual
Residents
15,360
18,294
17,895
16,365
20,618
21,210
23,485
16,982
16,373
17,945
17,683
17,121
16,135
14,809
18,255
16,775
16,551
21,547
19,983
16,273
17,360
15,483
17,276
19,914
20,608
11,836
14,671
16,308
14,387
14,950

Pakistani
#
%
81
0.5%
126
0.7%
324
1.8%
2,237 13.7%
6,785 32.9%
13,553 63.9%
10,037 42.7%
2,789 16.4%
70
0.4%
959
5.3%
6,429 36.4%
8,516 49.7%
113
0.7%
27
0.2%
7,909 43.3%
1,877 11.2%
459
2.8%
10,447 48.5%
12,058 60.3%
439
2.7%
571
3.3%
1,153
7.4%
1,859 10.8%
14,397 72.3%
657
3.2%
25
0.2%
1,815 12.4%
460
2.8%
68
0.5%
374
2.5%

Bangladeshi
#
%
2
0.0%
17
0.1%
25
0.1%
617
3.8%
1,669 8.1%
1,127 5.3%
553
2.4%
267
1.6%
6
0.0%
122
0.7%
78
0.4%
398
2.3%
3
0.0%
4
0.0%
1,467 8.0%
344
2.1%
197
1.2%
497
2.3%
1,806 9.0%
1
0.0%
42
0.2%
140
0.9%
67
0.4%
154
0.8%
90
0.4%
1
0.0%
92
0.6%
63
0.4%
7
0.0%
7
0.0%

Indian
2011 Census Ward
#
%
0.8
Baildon
121
0.5
Bingley
90
%
%
0.7
Bingley Rural
133
%
5.2
Bolton and Undercliffe*
850
%
4.2
Bowling and Barkerend*
858
%
4.5
Bradford Moor*
954
%
City*
1,632 6.9
%
Clayton and Fairweather
1,201 7.1
Green*
%
0.7
Craven
112
%
0.8
Eccleshill
151
%
Great Horton*
1,517 8.6
%
3.2
Heaton*
545
%
1.6
Idle and Thackley
255
%
0.4
Ilkley
56
%
0.7
Keighley Central
136
%
0.5
Keighley East
83
%
0.4
Keighley West
74
%
2.8
Little Horton*
602
%
4.5
Manningham*
894
%
2.5
Queensbury*
408
%
1.6
Royds*
272
%
1.8
Shipley
275
%
1.8
Thornton and Allerton*
309
%
3.8
Toller*
750
%
2.0
Tong*
416
%
0.2
Wharfedale
25
%
2.0
Wibsey*
293
%
1.9
Windhill and Wrose
307
%
0.3
Worth Valley
45
%
1.3
Wyke
191
%
281,096
92,589 32.94 7,458 2.65% 11,50 4.0
BRADFORD (CITY)
9
%
1
TOTAL
106,61 20.41
2.5
522,452
9,863 1.89% 13,55
DISTRICT
TOTAL
%
9
4
%
5
%
*Ward is part of Bradford (city)
Table 2-2: Bradford District's South Asian Population, 2011 (Office for National Statistics 2013)
The majority of South Asians in the district are of Pakistani origin, and are concentrated
in the Bradford city center. In 2011, Pakistanis represented 20.4% of the district, and constituted
the majority population in the Toller, Manningham, and Bradford Moor areas of Bradford (see
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Figure 2-8). In Toller, Pakistanis represented 72.3% of the census ward (14,397 Pakistanis/
19,914 total residents). Telling of the Pakistani presence in the city, a Pakistani Consulate is
located in downtown Bradford (53.796934°, -1.756171°). As seen in Figure 2.9, the district's
Indian community is centered in western Bradford. The largest concentration of Indians is in
Great Horton, where they represented 8.6% of the census ward (1,517 Indians/17,683 total
residents). Lastly, the Bangladeshi population is the smallest of the South Asian communities,
representing 7.6% of the district's South Asian population. As seen in Figure 2-10, the
Bangladeshi population is centered in downtown Keighley and in southeast Bradford. The
largest concentration of Bangladeshis is in Manningham, where they constituted 9% of the
census ward in 2011 (1,806 Bangladeshis/19,983 total residents) (Office for National Statistics
2013b).
By religion, Bradford's Indian population is the most diverse of the South Asian
communities. In 2011, 32.2% of Bradford's ethnic Indian population identified themselves as
Hindu, 30.6% as Muslim, and 25.3% as Sikh. The district's Pakistani and Bangladeshi
populations, on the other hand, are predominately Muslim. According to the 2011 Census,
94.3% of the ethnic Pakistanis identified themselves as Muslim, as did 93.8% of the district's
Bangladeshi population (Office for National Statistics 2013b). In all, 87.6% of the South Asians
in Bradford District are Muslim.
Diversity within the Bradford's South Asian religious communities generally corresponds
to the immigrants' places of origin. For example, Bradford's Hindu population is divided into
two distinct groups, the Gujuratis and Punjabis. More than half of the Gujuratis, who outnumber
the Punjabis, immigrated to Bradford from East Africa. The two groups are distinctly different,
and have developed their own social and cultural societies, as well as established their own
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Figure 2-7: 2011 Census, South Asian Population in Bradford (Map)

Figure 2-8: 2011 Census, Ethnic Pakistani Population in Bradford (Map)

42

Figure 2-9: 2011 Census, Ethnic Indian Population in Bradford (Map)

Figure 2-10: 2011 Census, Ethnic Bangladeshi Population in Bradford (Map)
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Hindu temples in Bradford (Halstead 1988). The Muslim community reflects similar diversity.
The Pashtuns from the area of Peshawar and Punjabis from Attock District are commonly
associated with the Islamic revivalist Deobandi and Tablighi Jamaat movements. However, the
majority of Bradford's Muslim community is from Mirpur and practice the Sufi-oriented
Barelevi form of Islam (McLoughlin 1998).
The Establishment of South Asian Communities in Bradford
The establishment of the South Asian communities in Bradford has been traced to World
War II. According to Dahya (1974), the first South Asians to settle in Bradford were
unemployed lascars who, in 1941, were directed by British authorities to find work in wartime
munitions factories in Leeds and Bradford. The community was small during the war. In 1945,
there were approximately 30 former lascars in Bradford, living in the vicinity of the University
of Bradford in homes owned by Polish immigrants (Cohen 1974).
After the war, labor demands in the city's woolen mills encouraged further South Asian
immigration. Bradford's wool industry, which was the city's most important industry, had
attracted migrant labor since the 19th century. For example, German and Irish immigrants
settled in Bradford in the 19th and early 20th century, and Eastern Europeans began arriving
during the middle of the 20th century. By the 1950s, however, the Eastern Europeans began to
leave the mills for higher paying jobs in other sectors. Initially, females filled the vacancies in
the mills, but they were excluded by law from working the overnight shifts that were introduced
in the 1950s. These restrictions introduced the demand for a new source of inexpensive labor to
work the overnight shifts that were introduced when the mills installed new machinery and
converted to 24-hour operations to compete with growing international competition.
To meet the new labor demand, Bradford's mills turned to South Asian laborers who, on

44

average, earned less than British workers. In 1961, the average weekly wage for manual labor
was £15, but the average Asian in Britain earned £8.25. By 1971, the average wage had risen to
£36.25, while the average Asian still only earned £16.10 (Halstead 1988). Because South Asian
labor was relatively inexpensive, Bradford's woolen mills actively recruited in South Asia by
placing advertisements for labor in Pakistani newspapers. Although an Asian laborer in the
1960s and 1970s earned roughly half the wage of his or her British counterpart, the wages still
attracted South Asian laborers because the average weekly wage in Mirpur at the time was 37
pence (Shaw 1988).
Bradford's South Asian population, particularly the Pakistani community, has continued
to grow rapidly since the 1960s. In 1964, there were an estimated 12,000 Pakistanis and
Bangladeshis in Bradford; in 2011, there were 116,477- representing an 871% population growth
in under 50 years (Cohen 1974; Office for National Statistics 2013d). Figure 2-11 depicts the
growth of Bradford's New Commonwealth population between 1961 and 2011. Immigrants from
the West Indies and Africa are included in this graph, but their immigration has not been as
numerically significant as that of the South Asians. In 2011, there were only 8,574 West Indians
and Africans in Bradford (Office for National Statistics 2013d). As such, the chart primarily
Bradford's New Commonwealth Population
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for National Statistics 2001a)
Figure 2-11: Bradford's New Commonwealth Population 1961-2001
45

represents the growth of Bradford's South Asian community. The significant population growth
after 1961 is due in large part to the permanent settlement of South Asian laborers and their
families in Bradford because of the aforementioned Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962.
Socio-Economic Conditions of Bradford's South Asian Communities
According to most socio-economic indicators, Bradford's Sikh and Hindu communities
fare better than the city's Muslim population. According to Halstead (1988), members of the
Sikh community were among the first South Asians to leave the woolen mills when jobs in better
paying sectors were still available. Their wives also commonly work, and the community has
little objection to coeducation or western clothing; some are even willing to abandon their
turbans and beards to more easily find work (Halstead 1988).
As a result, home ownership in the Sikh community is high. According to the 2001
Census (the most recent census data for home ownership by religion), 86% of Sikh households in
Bradford owned their own homes, 35% of whom owned their homes outright. The rate of home
ownership among the Hindu community was even higher. In 2001, 88% of Hindu households
owned their own homes. By comparison, 74% of Muslim households owned their own homes,
27% of whom owned their homes outright. In terms of home ownership, Bradford's South Asian
communities each fared better than White British households. As of 2001, 72% of White British
households in Bradford owned their own homes (Office for National Statistics 2001b).
Compared to White British households, a lower percentage of Muslims were living in
council homes in 2001. While 12% of White British households lived in rented council homes in
2001, only 4% of Muslim households lived in council housing (Office for National Statistics
2001b). Although this could be interpreted to suggest the Muslims are doing better
economically, the lower proportion of Muslims in council estates is due in part to discriminatory
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housing practices and the Muslims' hesitance to move into council estates associated with crime
and racism. According to Kundnani (2001), only 2% of Bradford's council housing was
allocated to Asians. As a result, the Muslim community was compelled to stay in the inner city
where housing prices were kept low by white flight from Bradford's working class
neighborhoods (Kundnani 2001). Phillips (2006) points out young British Muslims in Bradford
also try to avoid council estates because of the crime, drugs, and gangs associated with them.
Some of the large estates are also associated with racism, as participants in Phillips' study
identified some estates in Bradford are "not for Asians" (Phillips 2006).
Although there is near-parity between the White British and South Asian Muslim
populations in terms of home ownership, there is wide disparity between them in terms of
education and employment rates. By religion, Muslim adults have the lowest level of
educational qualifications in Bradford, as represented in Figure 2-12. In 2001, more than half
(50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford between 16 and 74 years old had no educational or
vocational qualifications (Office for National Statistics 2001d). Younger Muslims have more
educational qualifications than older Muslims in Bradford, but Muslims still had the fewest
educational qualifications in every age group, as depicted in Figure 2-13. Even though Muslims
constituted only 14.2% of Bradford's adult population in 2001, one in five Bradfordians (20.5%)
without qualifications was from the Muslim community (Office for National Statistics 2001d).
The Muslims' low level of educational qualifications most likely contributes to their high
rate of unemployment. In 2001, 7.7% of Bradford's population was characterized as either longterm unemployed or as never having worked. The unemployment rates of the Hindus and Sikhs
were slightly better, at 5.8% and 6.2% respectively. However, nearly a third (30.3%) of all
Muslim adults were characterized as either long-term unemployed or as never having
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worked (Office for National Statistics 2001c). Muslims represented 56% of all the Bradfordians
who had never worked or were long-termed unemployed in 2001.
As a result of the recession, overall unemployment rates in Bradford have increased since
2001. According to the 2011 Census, 11.1% of Bradford's population was characterized as either
long-term unemployed or as never having worked. The unemployment rates of the Hindus and
Sikhs in Bradford both increased, to 8.5% and 9.4% respectively. Although the Muslim rate of
unemployment decreased slightly to 29.2%, they still represented 54.1% of all Bradfordians who
had never worked or were long-termed unemployed in 2011 (Office for National Statistics
2013c). Figure 2-14 compares the unemployment rates in 2001 and 2011.
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(Office for National Statistics 2001c)
Figure 2-12: Percentage of Bradford's Population without Educational, Vocational Qualifications
The high rate of unemployment in the Muslim community is partly attributable to the
cultural tendency of Muslim women to remain in the home to care for the family. According to
the 2011 Census, 45.7% of Muslim females in Bradford had never worked in the formal
economy (Office for National Statistics 2013c). Nevertheless, Muslim males still had the highest
rate of unemployment by religious affiliation. In 2011, 6.9% of all males in Bradford District
were long-termed unemployed or had never worked, compared to 11.6% of Muslim males.
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While Muslims represented 21.3% of the male population in Bradford District, 35.7% of the
males in Bradford who were either long-term unemployed or had never worked were Muslim
(Office for National Statistics 2013c).
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Figure 2-13: Percentage of Bradford's Population without Educational Qualifications, by Age
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Figure 2-14: Percentage of Bradfordians who have Never Worked or were Long-term
Unemployed, by Religion (2001 and 2011)
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2.6 Education and Bradford's Muslim Community
Factors Contributing to the Muslim Community's Low Level of Educational and
Vocational Qualifications
In 2002, Katz interviewed 300 Bradfordian youth, a majority of whom were South Asian
Muslims. Katz found only 11% of those she interviewed in Bradford demonstrated a high level
of the "life skills" necessary to transition from adolescence to adulthood, including the ability to
handle money, eat well, and apply for work. By contrast, 34% of the national sample possessed
a high level of these skills (Katz 2002). Her study also highlighted a number of the obstacles
which the city's South Asian Muslim students face when it comes to realizing their educational
aspirations, including the lack of positive role models, poor communication skills and limited
proficiency in English.
In addition to Katz's findings, other factors thought to contribute to the Muslim
community's low level of educational and vocational qualifications include the socioeconomic
status of the earliest Muslim immigrants to Bradford, the reluctance of some immigrant parents
to allow their children to pursue higher education, and the extended absences of South Asian
Muslim children from school. The Muslims' perception that British schools threaten their
cultural and religious identities likely also contributes to the community's qualification gap
because it contributes to the reluctance of some Muslim parents to send their children to British
schools. The reported sense of alienation some Muslim youth feel in British schools may also
contribute to their lack of qualifications as anecdotal evidence suggests it reduces their
attentiveness at school.
Generally speaking, the first Muslim immigrants to Bradford were uneducated, rural
laborers. As a result, the earliest Muslim immigrants placed greater emphasis upon work over
education to make a living (Shackle 2010). The first immigrants' own lack of education, as well
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as their emphasis on work over education, likely contributed to the limited educational
qualifications of the second and third generation immigrants.
Studies and historical examples have also shown the reluctance of immigrant parents in
Bradford to allow their children, particularly their daughters, to pursue an education. Their
reluctance has likely also contributed to the Muslim community's low level of qualifications. For
example, in the 1970s, Muslim parents Abdullah Patal and Riaz Shahid famously removed their
daughters from school because they did not want them attending mixed-sex secondary schools in
Bradford. Katz's (2002) study found Muslim immigrant parents continued to resist allowing
their daughters to pursue an education, even after they turned 18 years old. Moreover, 38% of
the youth she interviewed in Bradford stated the need of their families for them to stay in the
home influenced their decision to either drop out of school or study close to home (Katz 2002).
Another known factor to contribute to the Muslims' education gap is their limited
proficiency in English, even among second and third generation immigrants. Even though many
of the South Asian Muslim youth interviewed in Katz's study were born in England, their limited
English skills were noted in the study results. Katz pointed to the limited interaction between
South Asian Muslim children and non-Muslims, inferred to be native-English speakers, as
contributing to the Muslims' limited proficiency. Noting the same, Lewis (2007) attributes the
limited interaction between Muslim and non-Muslim youth to the time Muslim children spend
after school in the city's madrassas. According to Lewis, Muslim boys and young men are often
required by their families to attend the madrasa for several hours each day after school to attain
an Islamic education. This schedule allows little time for Muslim youth to socialize with each
other, let alone with non-Muslims (Lewis 2007).
To further explain the young Muslims' limited English skills, Lewis (2007) also points to
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the Muslim community's continued preference for arranged, transcontinental marriages.
Through these marriages, British Pakistani families arrange spouses from Pakistan for their
British-born sons and daughters. As a result, many South Asian Muslim children in Bradford
continue to be born to families where at least one parent is a new immigrant, and who themselves
often have limited English skills. In support of his claim, Lewis highlights a study of British
Pakistani pupils and their fathers. Of the 23 households in the study in northern England, all but
one had at least one parent who was a new immigrant. More than half of the fathers in the study
could not fluently communicate in English, and two-thirds of the mothers could not read or write
English (Lewis 2007).
The 2011 Census revealed the number of households in Bradford where English was the
main language of the children but was not spoken by adults in the household. According to the
census, 2,943 (1.5%) households in Bradford had this language barrier in 2011. Although the
census did not identify the religious or ethnic backgrounds of these households, as seen in Figure
2-15, these households were concentrated in South Asian neighborhoods. For example, in
Toller, where Pakistanis represent 72.3% of the population, 5.3% of the households there had
children whose main language was English, but whose parents did not speak it (Office for
National Statistics 2013e).
Because of the limited English skills of immigrant parents, many South Asian Muslim
children in Bradford get their most exposure to English at school. However, the immigrant
children's exposure to English can be interrupted by truancy and extended absences from school,
factors which are known to also contribute to the Muslim community's low level of
qualifications. In particular, education authorities in Bradford have noted how school term visits
to the subcontinent are especially disruptive to the children's education. In the early 1980s,
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Figure 2-15: 2011 Census: Language Barriers at Home, Bradford District (Map)
controversial head teacher Ray Honeyford estimated the education of a third of the pupils at
Bradford’s Drummond Middle School was interrupted by extended school-term visits to the
subcontinent (Halstead 1988). Similar numbers were reported more recently at Victoria Primary
School in Keighley, where approximately 98% of the school's students are South Asian. As of
2001, 44% of the students in the Bradford area school had a prolonged absence of at least four
weeks, though the average extended absence from school was over ten weeks, according to
Headmaster Kay Lindley (Crace 2004). The students' extended absences disrupt both their
mastery of English and education. Explaining the impact of these absences, the school's assistant
head teacher claimed:
Almost all our children don't speak English at home, and many speak little, if at all, when
they first arrive here. As a result, their learning can be fragile and needs constant
reinforcement. When they go away for a long time they stop speaking English and forget
much of what they've learnt. This is critical for a curriculum delivered in English. (Crace
2004)
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According to the staff, even the school’s best students struggled to make-up the material missed
during their extended school term visits to the subcontinent.
The impact of these trips to the subcontinent has also been explored in qualitative studies.
For example, a participant in M.Y. Alam’s (2006) study of Pakistani Muslim males in Bradford
attributed his limited education to an extended visit to Pakistan, as he explained:
I went to Pakistan in nineteen ninety-five. My father went over to build himself a house.
The general idea was to go back and live back home. I'd just started my 'A' levels and my
father asked me to come over in the summer holidays - 'Cove over, we haven't seen you
for such a long time.'
I left and I spent sixteen months there; didn't complete my first year. My education, I
couldn't really get into it when I came back, plus most of my friends were already at
university. I did 'A' levels at Bradford College and within two or three months I left. I'd
have loved to have gone to university and got a degree in something but that's not how
things worked out. (Alam 2006)
The participant's account of struggling to make-up missed coursework is in line with studies that
indicate students who miss significant periods of school commonly struggle to complete their
education or achieve high qualifications. According to a British government study, only 35% of
students who miss between 10% and 20% of their schooling achieve the five A* to C GCSEs
necessary to continue on in higher education (Barnett 2011).
Experiences of the Muslim Community in Bradford-Area Schools
Public education is commonly seen as a tool in nation building (Marginson 2002; Meyer
1977). This is especially true of those who ascribe to the modernist interpretation of the nation,
or the view that the nation is a relatively new phenomenon constructed by the modern state.
Hobsbawm, a leading proponent of this view, argues public education was one of the most
important tools available to the state in creating the nation. In addition to standardizing the
nation's language, public schools instilled the "image and heritage of the nation" in the student
(Hobsbawm 1992). Public education plays a similar role in the acculturation of immigrants. In
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the 1960s and 1970s, for example, local authorities hoped Bradford's public schools would help
to integrate minority immigrant students into "mainstream" British society (Halstead 1988).
Despite the authorities' intent for schools to help integrate the immigrants, experiences in
Bradford-area schools have had the opposite effect for some within the Muslim community who
felt marginalized by their encounters with prejudice and cultural misunderstandings at school.
For example, another Pakistani male in Alam's (2006) study attributed his sense of exclusion
from British society to his experiences at school, as he explained:
I'm an outsider, we're outsiders. I don't want to say we're left out or no one likes us or
anything like that but we're like aliens from another planet. Some people treat us or see
us that way and we might as well be. At school there were some teachers who said it, in
a sly, clever way about us being not the same. Still now it happens, this. Even the ones
who were okay used to sort of assume it because they were trying to be nice and help out.
Some of them, they're genuinely nice but even them, they can't help it. Any time
anything happened, and they were like, 'Is it 'cos you got cultural problems?' 'Don't your
parents understand you?' Yeah we understand. It’s your culture, isn't it? It's hard being
in two cultures, innit?' that kind of stuff. Everything about us was about us as pakis, not
normal people because we weren't normal people, weren't the same people. Most of them
didn't bother me and I didn't bother them. I don't know if they were racist but they just
cruised through - they didn't give a damn so we didn't either. I left school with hardly
nowt worth writing home about. My own fault. Hold my hands up, but a better school
would have made a difference.(italics added for emphasis) (Alam 2006)
The participant's account demonstrates how the sense of exclusion at school can contribute to the
students' reduced attentiveness and interest at school, both of which likely led to the participant's
own lack of qualifications.
The participant's account of exclusion and prejudice in Bradford-area schools is not
thought to be atypical. Katz's (2002) study found students in Bradford were twice as likely as
other participants in the nation to claim they had experienced racism at school. One of the
participants in Katz's study claimed, "If I did things again, I would change the teachers, I would
try my best to get away from racist people, especially the teachers that I thought frankly were
racist. I really hate them, I really do. They are so unfair and have no understanding about our
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lives" (BBC News 2002).
Like the participant in Katz's study, British Muslims have argued state schools fail to
fully understand or accommodate their cultural and religious identities. The former director of
the Association of Muslim Schools, Idreas Mears, has argued the schools' failure to understand
their Muslim students contributes to the students' sense of alienation, as he argues:
State schools do not handle the meaning of Muslim identity well for the children. In
actual fact, the way that general society looks at Muslims is as an immigrant minorityethnic-racial-group and how young people are made to look at themselves through the
teaching in state schools tells them 'you are this marginal group/minority group and have
therefore got to integrate with the mainstream'. So there's a process of marginalization
and that often leads to resentment. (Meer 2009)
In response, Muslims in Britain have worked to inject their own values into state schools. When
this has failed, they have worked to open independent Muslim schools. These efforts were
undertaken in part to preserve the Muslims' unique cultural identities; however, they were also
driven by the Muslim community's aspirations to more fully establish Islam in Britain.
Injecting Muslim Values into Bradford Schools and the Opening of Independent Muslim
Schools
The perceived failure of Bradford-area schools to accommodate Muslim values has, over
the years, frustrated the city's Muslim community. The city's Muslims have also expressed
frustration when they thought schools in Bradford threatened their cultural identities. For
example, Riaz Shahid, a parent who, in the 1970s, sent his daughter to Pakistan rather than have
her attend a mixed-sex school in Bradford, complained, “[In British schools,] Muslim children
are being systematically transformed and indoctrinated into a British way of life, and are losing
their identity" (McLoughlin 1998). Shahid’s concerns were not necessarily unwarranted since
local authorities at the time favored a policy of integration over multiculturalism. These
frustrations spurred the efforts of Muslim parents and associations in Bradford to inject their
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cultural values and preferences into state schools. In time, they also lead to the community's
efforts to establish independent and state-funded Muslim schools in Bradford.
Since the 1960s, Muslim immigrants have worked to implement changes in Bradfordarea schools. In the 1970s, Muslim parents and organizations successfully introduced the
teaching of Islam in area schools, and in the 1980s, the community successfully lobbied the local
government to serve halal food in those schools attended by Muslims. These efforts were in
response to local demands, but they also represented the recognition of the wider British Muslim
community that it needed to implement changes within state schools to transmit their religious
heritage onto their children (Meer 2009).
According to Halstead (1998), it was traditionally the responsibility of the mothers and
mosques in Bradford to transmit religious education onto their children. In the 1960s, however,
Muslims in Bradford became aware of the state’s responsibility under the 1944 Education Act to
provide denominational education in state schools. The Act allowed parents to remove their
children from school at the beginning or end of each school day for off-site religious education.
The act also made provisions for an outside instructor to give religious instruction in the school.
In the 1960s, Muslim associations, including the Muslim Association of Bradford and the
Muslim Education Trust, lobbied local authorities to allow instructors of Islam to teach in
Bradford's secondary schools. Although their demand was guaranteed under the 1944 Education
Act, local authorities were hesitant to accommodate the community’s request for Islam to be
taught in state schools. Bradford’s Director of Education, F.J. Adams, worried the introduction
of Islamic religious education would be divisive and counter the city’s policy of promoting
integration- a policy founded on the belief that minority immigrants should adopt the culture of
the majority (Halstead 1988). Despite his objections, the Council approved the Muslim
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community's request, though only in part. Initially, the Council restricted the state-funded
instruction of Islam to Bradford’s immigrant education centers. In 1972, however, local
authorities more fully consented to the community’s demands and permitted Islam to be taught in
any secondary school in Bradford.
Having secured the introduction of Islamic religious education in state schools,
Bradford's Muslim community began a campaign against the serving of non-halal food in those
schools attended by Muslims. They secured this concession in 1983, but not without opposition.
Animal rights activists were particularly opposed because of the method of animal slaughter
mandated under Islamic law. In the face of this opposition, the Bradford Council of Mosques
mobilized the community. According to Halstaed (1998), an estimated 3,000 Muslims joined a
pro-hahal demonstration in Bradford, and 7,000 people signed a petition supporting the
provision. The mayor of Bradford was part of the opposition, but the Bradford Council
ultimately voted in favor of the Muslim community.
Through such political pressure, the Muslim community has been able to inject some of
its values into existing Bradford schools. However, the community's other goals, including its
demand for single-sex education, were only achieved through the opening of Muslim faith-based
schools. Efforts to open a Muslim school in Bradford were initiated in the 1970s, but they did
not successfully establish one until the following decade.
According to Halstead (1998), one of the Muslim community's most sustained demands
in Bradford has been its demand for single-sex education. Many in the conservative community
oppose co-education, particularly after primary school, because it violates their religious and
cultural standards that outside of the family the sexes should be separated at puberty. Halstead
argues the Muslims' demand for single-sex education only intensified as Bradford Council
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moved away from it in the 1970s. For their part, local authorities favored co-education, arguing
it promoted greater gender equality, and by 1974, Bradford Council only operated one girls’
school, the Belle Vue Girls’ School (Halstead 1988).
The Muslim community's demands for single-sex education came to the fore in 1973. In
May of that year, a local parent, Abdullah Patel, publically objected to the placement of his
daughter at Hanson Upper School, a co-educational secondary school in Bradford. After his
appeals to the Department of Education and Prime Minister were dismissed, Patel removed his
daughter from school. Despite threats of legal action against him, he kept his daughter at home
until 1975, when she turned sixteen and could legally leave school. In December of 1973, Riaz
Shahid, an immigration consultant, left the UK after a residence of 15 years so his 13-year-old
daughter did not have to attend a co-educational school (Halstead 1988). Also in 1973, the
Muslim Association of Bradford, a Deobandi-orientated organization, proposed changes to the
law that would have allowed girls to legally leave school at the age of twelve.
The Muslim Association of Bradford's proposal had little chance of adoption, but Muslim
associations continued working towards opening a Muslim girls' school. In 1974, Patel helped
found the Muslim Parents’ Association (MPA) that worked to coordinate Muslim demands for
concessions at Bradford's existing schools and to open new Muslim ones. In the 1980s, Shahid,
who had since returned to Bradford, also became involved with the MPA and unsuccessfully
worked to secure state funding for five Muslim schools, including a girls’ school (Halstead
1988).
According to McLoughlin (1998), the MPA ultimately failed to secure government
funding because the Bradford Council of Mosques (BCM), a local government funded
organization established in 1981, did not endorse the MPA-backed plans. Although the BCM
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agreed with the objectives of the plan, the organization did not support the plan because it did not
view the MPA as a legitimate representation of Bradford's Muslim community (McLoughlin
1998). For its part, the BCM was involved in advocating the integration of Muslim values into
local schools, securing the aforementioned serving of halal food in Bradford schools, for
example.
Although the MPA failed to establish a state-funded Muslim girls’ school, the Muslim
Association of Bradford successfully opened an independent girls' school in 1984. Initially
named Bradford Muslim Girls' Community School, the school opened with 26 students enrolled,
and largely served the Deobandi Pashtun community who would have sent their daughters to
Pakistan rather than have them attend a non-Muslim school (Lewis 2002). Despite initial
setbacks, including insufficient funding, inadequate facilities, unqualified teachers, and poor
government reviews, in time, the school made significant strides in improving its reputation. In
1989, the school hired qualified teachers for the first time, and in 1990, it became registered with
the Department of Education. In 1993, with 178 pupils enrolled, the school’s students achieved
GCSE results that were on par with other inner-city Bradford schools (McLoughlin 1998).
By 1994, these improvements allowed the school, renamed as Feversham College, to
submit a competitive application to receive state funding as a Voluntary-Aided (VA) school. As
a VA school, the government would pay, at the time, the school's running costs and 85% of its
capital costs. According to McLaughlin (1998), the school hoped earning VA status would ease
its abovementioned financial and staffing problems. The school's application had the support of
both the local community and local government, but the Secretary of State for Education
ultimately rejected the application. While recognizing the community's demand for single-sex
education, the Secretary of Education Gillian Shephard rejected the application on the grounds of
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safety and over concerns for its curriculum. The school lacked a viable means of escape from
the second floor in case of a fire, and the government was unsatisfied with the school's plans to
implement technology education as required by the National Curriculum (McLoughlin 1998).
Although the school's application was rejected on the grounds of safety and its
curriculum, the Muslim community assumed the government's rejection had greater meaning.
According to McLaughlin (1998), the Muslim community saw the school's application as "a
symbolic test of Muslims' equal participation and inclusion in the British nation", and the
government's rejection of the application was seen as a rejection of the Muslim community.
Demonstrating the sense of rejection felt by Bradford's Muslim population, McLaughlin points to
the following reactions in the national press:
The Government has missed an opportunity to show the Muslim community that it values
what they are doing for their daughters ... Their decision not to is a violation of the
Muslim community's human rights [The Independent, 17 February 1995).
It is unfortunate that the UK remains out of step with Europe ... [The] Republic of
Ireland, Denmark and the Netherlands already have state-funded Muslim schools. We
look forward to the day when we as British Muslims can also claim to have equitable
treatment from our government [Q-News, 24 February 1995). (McLoughlin 1998)
The rejection was also felt by some of the students at Feversham College. In letters to the
Muslim News, one student wrote, "I feel rejected, upset and unequal", and another wrote, "They
wouldn't give it to us because we are Muslims, and they wouldn't like to see the Muslims getting
the best education" (McLoughlin 1998). The school's failure to receive state funding in 1994
clearly left some Muslims in Bradford feeling rejected and wondering if they were an equal part
of the nation.
Despite the rejection, Feversham College reapplied for government funding, and in 2001,
was awarded state funding. According to the school's website, the achievement was a "landmark
in the college's journey"(Feversham College 2013). It was also representative of the journey
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taken by the British Muslim community to open and fund Muslim schools in Britain. According
to Meer (2009), the state's funding of Muslim schools in Britain was made possible with the
election of New Labour in 1998. Meer observes the Conservative government had been "hostile
to the idea of state-funded Muslim schools", but New Labour had promised in its election
manifesto to support Muslim schools (Meer 2009). Blair's New Labour Government delivered
on its promise in its first year in government as two Muslim schools, the Islamia School in
London and Al-Furqan School in Birmingham became the first Muslim schools to be awarded
VA status.
Since 1998, there has been a significant growth in the number of Muslim faith-based
schools in England, including independent and state-funded schools. Not including madrassas,
in 2012, there were 142 Muslim schools in England, including 12 that were state funded
(Department of Education 2013). As seen in Figure 2-16, the growth in Muslim schools in
England has occurred over a relatively short period. One of the first Muslim schools in England
was the aforesaid Islamia School in London, which opened in 1983 with the financial support of
Yusuf Islam (the musician formerly known as Cat Stevens). By 1989, there were 15 Muslim
schools, and six years later, there were 25 in operation (Parker-Jenkins 2002; McLoughlin 1998).
In 2003, there were 53 Muslim schools, and by 2005, there were nearly 100 independent Muslim
schools in England (Garner 2005; BBC News 2007).
The rapid growth in Muslim schools represents a significant investment by the Muslim
community, and speaks to the community's intent to more fully establish both itself and a unique
Muslim identity in Britain. Explaining the role Muslim schools play in more fully establishing
the Muslim community, Mears, the former director of the Association of Muslim Schools, has
stated:
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I think we're at a very interesting stage. The metaphor I use is that the first Muslims that
came here were like the farmer standing on the ground; they were standing on it but
didn't have roots in it. But their seed has been scattered with some falling on good
ground, others falling on stony ground and yet some being blown away in the wind. In
some ways, we're only now at the beginning of establishing a genuine Muslim presence in
Britain, and Muslim schools are the key to that presence (italics added for emphasis).
(Meer 2009)
While Mears argues Muslim schools are critical to the establishment of the Muslim presence in
Britain, the head teacher at the Islamia School in London, Abdullah Trevathan, argues Muslim
schools are also crucial in the creation of a unique British Muslim identity, as he explained:
If anything - [the Islamia] school is about creating a British-Muslim culture, instead of, as
I've often said in the press, conserving or saving a particular culture, say from the
subcontinent or from Egypt or from Morocco or from wherever it may be. Obviously
those cultures may feed into this British-Muslim cultural identity, but we're not in the
business of preserving... it's just not feasible and it's not sensible... it's dead; I mean I'm
not saying those cultures are dead but it's a dead duck in the water as far as being here [in
Britain] is concerned. (Meer 2009)
The Muslim community in Britain is not monolithic, but is diverse in terms of its ethnicity, race,
places of origin, and culture. However, Muslim schools in Britain are seen by some as the key to
unifying the nation's Muslim population under the umbrella of a new and distinct "British
Muslim" identity.
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Figure 2-16: Number of Muslim Schools in England
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Chapter 3 Methodology
3.1 Research Questions
It is commonly held that the nation is predicated upon the ideal that its members enjoy
full equality in civil, legal, and political rights (Smith 1991; Gellner 1997). It is also argued that
a strong national identity, which is the "social glue" that binds the community together, is
promoted by economic advantage (Jacob, Toscano, and University of Pennsylvania 1964; Jelen
2011). However, according to most socio-economic indicators, immigrants are often
disadvantaged members of society. For example, 60% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households
in the UK live in poverty, compared to 20% of White British households (Modood 2006).
Peach (2006) has argued the Muslim community's poor socioeconomic conditions
contribute to their sense of exclusion from British society. This study sought to determine
whether perceptions of inequality have also affected the South Asian Muslims' very
identification with the nation. In so doing, this study sought to add empirical evidence to the
theoretical link between equality and national identity, evidence which is lacking according to
Shulman (2003). The education sector is one of the areas of public life where South Asian
Muslims have, in the past, expressed feelings of discrimination and inequality. It is also an area
where they have struggled to achieve the same level of qualifications as others in Britain. In
2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had no educational or vocational
qualifications (Office for National Statistics 2001d). The Home Office's inquiry into the 2001
Bradford riots also concluded educational opportunities were far from equal in the city (Home
Office 2001). Because of these conditions, this study used access to education as a key measure
of equality to test for an association between it and national identity. In addition to determining
whether Muslims in Bradford felt like they had equal access to an education, this study also
sought to explore their educational goals and the level of emphasis they place upon an education.
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These inquiries were intended to find other factors that may contribute to the Muslim
community's low level of qualifications.
In addition to exploring perceptions of equality and national identity, this study sought to
determine which acculturation strategies were being employed by young British Muslims.
According to Berry (1997), immigrants can pursue one of four acculturation strategies depending
on how they value the retention of their own cultural identities and their interactions with the
host society; these four strategies are: integration, assimilation, separation, or marginalization.
Despite the body of studies exploring these strategies elsewhere, Robinson (2009) claims Berry's
theory of acculturation has been understudied in Britain. As such, this study adds to the limited
body of studies exploring Berry's acculturation strategies in the country.
While Berry's theory of acculturation has been understudied in Britain, British Muslims
have commonly been accused of segregating themselves from society (Shaw 2002; Peach 2006).
For example, the government's inquiry into the 2001 Bradford riots also concluded that the
Muslim and White British communities were living "parallel lives" (Home Office 2001).
Concern for the Muslims' separation from British society has again come to the fore since 2011
as the Conservative Government has called for policies to better integrate them into society to
combat "home grown" extremism. Despite accusations that Muslims in Britain have pursued
segregation, Phillips (2006) argues British Muslims in Bradford are in fact eager to more fully
integrate into British society. Given conflicting reports, this study sought to determine whether
young British Muslims in Bradford more commonly exhibited indicators of integration or
segregation.
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Primary Research Questions
To address these issues, this study sought to answer the following core questions:
1. Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford identify with the nation? Do they identify
as being English or British? What are their dominant, or most important, identities?
2. Do British South Asian Muslims in Bradford see themselves as equal members of
society?
3. Is there an association between perceptions of equality and national identity?
4. Is education important to young British South Asian Muslims in Bradford, and what are
their educational goals? Have they been able to achieve the type of education that is most
important to them? Do they think they have equal access to educational opportunities?
5. What acculturation strategies have been adopted by young British South Asian Muslims?
Have they integrated into British society?
3.2 Assumptions and Hypotheses
Based upon a review of the available literature, this study worked under the following
assumptions and hypotheses:
Assumptions
1. Most British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old in Bradford are second or third
generation immigrants
2. British South Asian Muslims at the University of Bradford were from Bradford or the
immediate surrounding area
3. Respondents who identified with the nation would describe themselves as British or
English on the survey
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Hypotheses
1. Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but they would
be less likely than White British respondents to identify with the nation
2. Most young British South Asian Muslims would identify with the nation, but their
identity as Muslim would be the more dominant identity
3. Young British South Asian Muslims would be less likely than White British respondents
to see themselves as equal members of society
4. Young British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of society
would be more likely to identify with the nation than those Muslims who did not see
themselves as equal members of society
5. Education would be important to most young British South Asian Muslims, but their
educational goals would differ from those of young White British respondents
3.3 Study Design
Procedures
To answer the research questions, data was collected through administering a structured
questionnaire in Bradford, England in late December 2009 and early January 2010. Using nonprobable sampling, the questionnaire was completed by respondents at multiple locations in
Bradford, including Bradford City Center, Lister Park, Bradford College, the University of
Bradford, and multiple Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh places of worship (see Figure 3-1). To
minimize sampling and selection bias, static control points were established at the various survey
sites. For example, at the University of Bradford Library, the survey was administered at the
main entrance. This allowed the researcher to invite each library patron to participate in the
study. No incentives were offered to the participants, who were told the questionnaire was part
of an academic study exploring perceptions of education and national identity. The respondents
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completed the questionnaires themselves unless they asked the researcher to record their
answers.

Figure 3-1: Survey Sites in Bradford, West Yorkshire
Instrument
To gather data, a one-page, two-sided questionnaire was designed for the study. The
survey questions were designed to elicit the respondents' local and national identities,
educational goals, and perceptions regarding their access to education, as well as the access of
those of their religious and ethnic backgrounds. The questionnaire also sought to determine
whether the respondents saw themselves as equal members of society. The questionnaire, seen
in Figures 3-2 and 3-3, primarily utilized closed-ended questions which gave the respondents a
series of forced-choice alternatives, Likert rating scales, and checklists. Some of the questions
also allowed respondents to provide comments or additional responses not included in the survey
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Figure 3-2: Study Questionnaire (Page 1)
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Figure 3-3: Study Questionnaire (Page 2)
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design. The questionnaire recorded the respondent’s gender, age, citizenship, highest level of
education completed, ethnicity, religion, and earnings. To ensure the respondent’s identity
would remain anonymous, the survey did not record a name, address, or other personal details.
3.4 Study Site: Bradford, West Yorkshire, England (53° 47' 33'' N, 1° 45' 11'' W)
Physical Context
The study was conducted in Bradford, West Yorkshire, England. Bradford is located
approximately 47 kilometers (30 miles) northeast of Manchester, 14 kilometers (9 miles) west of
Leeds, and 278 kilometers (172 miles) north of London (see Figure 3-4). Bradford is the
administrative center of the City of Bradford, a metropolitan district that includes Bradford and
the surrounding towns (see Figure 3-5). Bradford is located in the eastern region of the South
Pennines, a low mountain range running north-south that separates the North West from North
East of England. As seen in Figure 3-6, Bradford is not located on a major river, but is situated
between two river valleys, the Aire Valley to the north and the Calder Valley to the south. Of
the two valleys, Bradford is closer to the Aire Valley. The city is situated at the bottom of a wide
valley which opens up to the west, where Bradford Beck (Stream) and its tributaries flow from
the Pennine Hills. The beck, which is now mostly beneath the city's foundations, flows east
towards the City Center, where beneath Bradford Cathedral it turns north to meet the Aire River.
The Bradford Beck was one of several streams that converged in Bradford, whose earlier
crossing points, or fords, likely gave the city its name - from the Old English Brád (Broad) Ford.
Although Bradford is not located along a major river, Bradford's geologic record
indicates the area once consisted of swamps, estuaries and coastal deltas. The ancient vegetation
created the local deposits of coal which have been extracted in Bradford since the 1600s. In
addition to a rich supply of coal, the bedrock from the Period also contains the ironstones,
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Picture 3-1: Surveys were conducted at the Abu Bakr Mosque on Steadman Terrace Road (Reid,
2010)

Picture 3-2: Inside the Shree Lakshmi Narayan Hindu Temple on Leeds Road, where surveys
were completed (Reid, 2010)
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Picture 3-3: Surveys were conducted outside the Guru Gobind Singh Sikh Hudwara on Leeds
Road (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-4: Most surveys were completed at the University of Bradford library, but some were
completed at the Atrium above (Reid, 2010)
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Picture 3-5: Cartwright Hall, Lister Park. Surveys were completed in the park, which was
donated to the city by Samuel Lister (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-6: Bradford City Hall in Centenary Square where surveys were conducted (Reid, 2010)
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Figure 3-4: Bradford, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom (Map)
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Figure 3-6: Terrain and Geography of Bradford (Map)
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sandstones and other sedimentary rocks that fueled Bradford's industrial economy. For example,
the ironstones were used to extract the iron used in the ironworks that were established in Low
Moor south of Bradford. According to Haworth (2006), the cannons fired at the Battle of
Trafalgar came from Low Moor, as did the plates used in the construction of the Sydney Harbor
Bridge. The area's sandstones, particularly the flagstones, were quarried and used as a prized
building stone throughout England, as Haworth claims, "London was said to be paved with 'gold'
because of the colour of the flagstones produced in Bradford" (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford
Heritage Recording Unit 2006). Each of these resources were themselves significant, but their
co-location, coupled with the city's access to canals, gave Bradford the economic advantage that
allowed it to become the "worsted capital" of the world in the 19th century (Howarth, Smith, and
Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006).
Social Context: Bradford's Industry and Immigration
Historically, Bradford's most important industry was the wool industry. The city's wool
trade was responsible for transforming Bradford from a market town to the industrial hub of a
global market in the 19th century. Although Bradford's woolen trade waned in the 20th century,
the industry created the cultural and ethnic diversity for which the city is known today. For
several centuries, Bradford's woolen industry attracted migrants to the city, including South
Asians in the second-half of the 20th century.
Bradford has been a site of woolen production since at least the 14th century. The
presence of a fulling mill in Bradford was first recorded in 1311 (Keighley 2007). However,
woolen production remained a cottage industry until the introduction of the steam engine in the
late 18th century. The introduction of the steam engine allowed woolen and worsted production
to move into the heart of the city, which allowed the mills to become large commercial
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endeavors.
When the first steam powered mill in Bradford opened in 1798, East Anglia was the
center of English worsted wool production (worsted yarn derives its name from the Norfolk
village of Worstead in East Anglia). By 1850, however, most of the country's worsted yarn and
cloth production had transferred to Yorkshire. In 1850, 88% of England's 850,000 spindles and
89% of the country's 326,000 power looms were in Yorkshire (Clapham 1910). The county
remained the center of woolen production into the 20th century. In 1904, 90% of the country’s
2,823 combing machines were in West Riding, which corresponds to present-day West
Yorkshire, South Yorkshire and North Yorkshire (Weld 1912).
When the country's woolen production shifted to Yorkshire at the start of the 19th
century, Halifax and Leeds were the centers of woolen manufacturing in the region. By the
middle of the 19th century, however, Bradford overtook its regional competitors (Smith n.d.).
Bradford's rise was aided by the aforementioned presence of local coal, engine manufacturing,
and metal works at Low Moor. Technological innovations in Bradford also gave the city its
competitive edge. For example, Samuel Lister's Comb (see Picture 3-9), which was patented in
1849, was one of several inventions in Bradford that mechanized the combing process, the last
and most difficult process of wool production to be mechanized (Weld 1912). The combination
of natural resources, innovation and entrepreneurship allowed Bradford historian
John James to write in 1841, "[Bradford] has risen to the capital of the worsted trade; and
assumed an importance which, when contrasted with its condition a few short years ago,
astonishes" (Webb 1976).
Bradford remained the world's preeminent wool manufacturer at the turn of the 20th
century. In 1907, Sir John Clapham wrote, "Bradford is the chief seat of wool-dealing, yarn-
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Picture 3-7:Victorian-era woolen mills still dot Bradford's cityscape. Drummonds Mill in the
foreground, Lister Mill in the background (Reid 2010)
dealing, and of all things commercial. Its supremacy is unquestionable. Bradford is actually by
far the greatest wool-working city in the Riding or, for that matter, in the world " (Clapham
1907). The growth in Bradford's textiles industry was accompanied by growth in its related
industries. Warehouses, dyeworks, printing presses, commercial services, and metal works all
thrived in Bradford during the 19th and early 20th centuries.
The rapid growth of Bradford's industrial base led to significant population growth in the
city during the 19th century. Attributing the population growth to the mechanization of the
worsted wool industry, Mortimore (1969) claims Bradford's population grew more rapidly than
many other northern industrial towns. In 1801, there were 29,733 inhabitants in Bradford and
the surrounding towns; by 1911, the population had grown to 293,321, representing an 885%
population growth (Mortimore 1969; Richardson 1968). The rapid population growth in the19th
century was reflected in Bradford's urban expansion, which is depicted in Mortimore's map (see
Figure 3-7). Mortimore depicts the urban extent of Bradford in 1950 compared to the outline of
Bradford in 1800.
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(Mortimore 1969)
Figure 3-7: Mortimore's Map of Bradford's Urban Expansion, 1800-1850
Bradford's population growth in the 19th century was primarily due to immigration. The
earliest immigrants to Bradford came from the surrounding towns, boroughs and counties. By
1851, 21.7% of Bradford's population was born outside of Yorkshire (Richardson 1968). During
the first half of the 19th century, international migrants also began arriving. In 1834, a minister
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at the Horton Lane Congregational Chapel in Bradford wrote of the city's changing human
landscape, "The natives of Scotland are here, the natives of Ireland are here, from the pleasant
vales of Devonshire men and women have come: from the banks of the Rhine and the Elbe they
are coming" (Bradford Heritage Recording Unit and Bradford Libraries and Information Service
1987). A century later, J.B. Priestley, the English novelist born in Bradford, echoed the
minister's description of Bradford's cosmopolitanism, as he wrote, "Bradford was determinedly
Yorkshire and provincial, yet some of its suburbs reached as far as Frankfurt or Leipzig"
(Bradford Heritage Recording Unit and Bradford Libraries and Information Service 1987).
A combination of "push" and "pull" factors brought the international migrants to
Bradford. For example, food shortages and landlessness in Ireland "pushed" Irish immigrants to
the city in the 19th century. Most immigrants to Bradford, however, were attracted by the
economic opportunities in the city. For example, German merchants settled in Bradford in the
second half of the 19th century to establish woolen export warehouses at the heart of the woolen
industry. The German influence on architecture and culture in Bradford is still observable in a
section of the city known as Little Germany.
Immigration to Bradford slowed as the textiles industry struggled at the turn of the 20th
century. International competition, changing fashion, and a depressed world economy contracted
Bradford's export market, and profits slumped. In 1920, the export of woolen and worsted goods
totaled 139.5 million pounds; the following year, it equaled only 62 million pounds (Smith n.d.).
The decreased demand for textiles in the 1920s and 1930s led to high unemployment and the
closure of many of the city's textile mills. Between 1928 and 1932, 400 textile mills in Bradford
closed (Smith n.d.).
Despite the economic downturn in the 1920s and 1930s, immigration to Bradford

81

Picture 3-8: The 64-Spindle Cap Spinner, c. 1828. During spinning, the roving is drawn out and
the fibers are twisted together to create thread (Reid, 2010)

Picture 3-9: The Lister Comb patented in 1849 by Samuel C. Lister of Manningham was one of
several local inventions that gave Bradford an edge in woolen manufacturing. Combing
straightens the wool fibers, separating the short wool from the long wool (Reid, 2010)
82

continued, though at a reduced rate. During the interwar years, Jewish immigrants came from
Southern and Eastern Europe, including Italy, Russia, Germany, and Poland. The Jewish
immigrants were not motivated by economic considerations like most of the earlier migrants to
Bradford. Like the Irish before them, Jewish immigrants were motivated by "push" factors at
home. In the case of the Jewish immigrants, they were fleeing anti-Semitism and persecution on
the Continent.
The Second World War spurred immigration again as the war created additional demand
for labor in the textile mills and wartime factories. South Asian immigrants first came to
Bradford at this time, finding work in the city's munitions factories. The demand for labor
continued after the war, leading the government to introduce schemes to entice workers to
Britain. For example, Ukrainians from the 14th Waffen SS 'Galicia' Division who were captured
by the British during the war were allowed to settle in Britain to protect them from retributions in
Stalinist Ukraine. Some of these settled in Bradford under the newly established European
Volunteer Workers scheme, as did a number a Polish servicemen who had served Britain during
the war.
Many of these immigrants initially found work in the city's woolen mills; however, by the
1950s, the Eastern European immigrants began leaving the textile mills for better paying jobs in
other sectors. Initially, females replaced the lost labor, but they were excluded by law from
working the overnight shifts that were introduced in the 1950s. South Asian males, who had
begun immigrating to the city during the war, fulfilled the new requirement for overnight
laborers as Bradford's mills began to actively recruit in South Asia. By 1964, there were 12,000
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Bradford, most of whom were working in the mills (Cohen
1974).
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By the 1960s, Bradford's woolen industry was in decline. Competition from overseas
increased as wool producing countries like Australia and South Africa, which had previously
supplied wool to Bradford, began to process it themselves. Clothing fashions also changed as
synthetic fibers replaced wool. Due to these changes, the number of Bradfordians employed in
the woolen industry declined sharply in the 1960s and 1970s. Between 1961 and 1978, the
number of workers employed in Bradford's textile mills dropped from 73,000 to 28,000
(Wainwright 2003). In 2002, there were fewer than 1,000 people still working in the city's
textiles industry (Howarth, Smith, and Bradford Heritage Recording Unit 2006). The few
textiles companies in Bradford today specialize in high quality fabrics.
As the textiles industry declined, its associated industries either left Bradford or adapted
to new markets. For example, firms in Keighley that had once made looms and spinning frames
now make lifts and escalators, while plants in Low Moor that once made dyestuffs have since
become chemical plants (Wainwright 2003). Printing companies are also still found in Bradford.
For example, the UK headquarters of Hallmark Cards is located in the city.
As South Asians were predominately employed in the mills, the decline in the city's
woolen industry had a disproportionate impact on the Muslim immigrant community. On one
hand, the closure of the mills led to the opening of small Asian businesses, mostly in the service
industry, as Asian families pooled their resources to open shops, restaurants and takeaways
(Kundnani 2001). However, the closure of the mills primarily led to the community's ongoing
high unemployment. It also reduced the interaction between the South Asian and White British
communities. According to Kundnani, the textile industry had been "the common thread binding
the white and Asian working class into a single fabric" (Kundnani 2001). As the mills closed,
however, the interaction between the two communities unraveled. The separation of the two
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communities was reinforced by the subsequent white flight from Bradford's working class
neighborhoods.
3.5 Selection of Bradford as the Study Site
Several factor contributed to the selection of Bradford as the study site, including its
social history and current demographics. As a center of recent immigration, Bradford is well
suited for studies related to the construction of national identity. Because of the immigrants'
poor economic standing and known disparities in educational opportunities, the city is also well
suited for this study's look at the hypothesized association between equality and national identity.
Within Bradford, the University of Bradford was selected as the primary study site. The
institution dates to 1832, when it opened as the Mechanics Institute. In 1882, it changed its name
to Bradford Technical College, and in 1957, the Bradford Institute of Technology was
established to offer higher education. In 1966, the Institute became the University of Bradford,
receiving a Royal Charter to become Britain's 40th University.
As depicted in Figure 3-8, the university's student body reflects the diversity of
Bradford's human terrain. According to information provided by the University Registrar's
Office at the time of the study, there were 12,314 students enrolled at the University of Bradford,
including 2,691 post-graduate students. Of the students domiciled in the UK, 4126 (44%) were
white, while 2912 (31%) were ethnic Pakistanis. Indicative of the university's outreach to the
city's Pakistani community, the university's chancellor since 2005 is Imran Khan, the former
cricketer and chairman of Pakistan's Tehreek-e-Insaf political party.
Conducting the surveys at the university was intended to gain greater access to the study's
target population, namely young British South Asian Muslims. As a male researcher, access to
the female South Asian Muslim population would have been otherwise limited. Attempts to gain
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access to female respondents were initially made through contacting male powerbrokers in some
of the city's mosques. These attempts, however, were ultimately unsuccessful because mosques
in Bradford remain a male-dominated domain. Conducting the study at the university, therefore,
allowed females to be included in the study. As an outsider, the university setting also facilitated
a more natural access to the city's young male Muslim population. Because the Muslim
community in Bradford is regularly scrutinized by outsiders, likely to include by security
services, the university setting facilitated access to Muslim males who might otherwise have
been suspicious of an outside researcher, particularly an American researcher inquiring about
their national identity and sense of belonging in British society.
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Figure 3-8: Ethnic Breakdown of University of Bradford Students
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Picture 3-10: Atrium and Richmond Building, University of Bradford (Reid, 2010)
3.6 Study Limitations
Conducting the study at the university granted access to a large number of young British
South Asian Muslims, but using the university students as the sample population also introduced
limitations and potential biases in the study. For example, it reduced the likelihood the entire
sample would be from Bradford. At the time of the study, only 30% of the students enrolled at
the university were from Bradford according to the Registrar’s Office. Nevertheless, the
percentage of British Pakistani students from Bradford was higher. At the time of the study,
56% of the British Pakistani students enrolled at the university were from Bradford. With
moderate to high confidence, the study worked under the assumption that British South Asian
Muslim respondents surveyed at the university were likely from Bradford or the immediate
surrounding area.
While the South Asian Muslim respondents at the University of Bradford offer valuable
insights into the city's Muslim community, this subset may not fully represent the wider Muslim
community. Because over half of the Muslim adults in Bradford have no educational or
vocational qualifications, those at the university are more privileged than many of their peers.
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They have had opportunities unknown to most in the city’s Muslim community, and, as a result,
they may have been more predisposed to identify with the nation than other Muslims in the city.
While this may be the case, because most respondents at the university indicated they too had
experienced or witnessed inequality in British society, the sample population still serves as a
suitable sample to test for associations between perceptions of equality and national identity.
By relying on the sample from the University of Bradford, survey questions related to
educational priorities or goals may also have been biased. As students at a university that
focuses on science, technology, liberal arts, and life sciences, it could be expected that most
students surveyed would favor a liberal education, regardless of the respondent’s ethnic or
religious backgrounds. As such, the survey results may have misrepresented the educational
priorities of the wider, more conservative Muslim community.
Lastly, based upon the history of the Muslim immigrant community, the study worked
under the assumption that British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old were most likely
second or third generation immigrants. However, the survey did not ask respondents to indicate
how long they or their families had been in Britain. This limited the analysis and conclusions
that could have been derived by further exploring the differences between immigrant
generations.
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Chapter 4 Results and Analysis
Between late December 2009 and mid-January 2010, the questionnaire was administered
to 576 participants in Bradford. The majority of participants were UK citizens, but the survey
was also completed by citizens from at least 50 other countries and territories (see Appendix B).
Only those surveys completed by UK citizens were included in the study. Of the 359
questionnaires completed by UK citizens, 305 surveys were answered in full. The other 54
surveys were partially completed, however, individual responses were included where possible.
4.1 Demographics
Gender: The survey was completed by 154 (42.9%) females and 205 (57.1%) males.
Age: As depicted in Figure 4-1, the study was completed by 262 (73%) participants under 30
years old, the study’s target age group. The survey was also completed by 97 (27%) participants
over the age of 29.
Ethnicity: As depicted in Figure 4-2, most participants were Asian. The study was completed
by 199 (55.4%) British Asians, including 194 (54%) British South Asians, the study’s target
population. The survey was also completed by 127 (35.4%) White British participants, and 33
(9.2%) participants who described themselves as Arab/Middle Eastern, Black, Mixed, or Other.
Of the 194 South Asians in the study, 148 (41.2%) were of Pakistani origin. Figure 4-3 depicts
the ethnic breakdown of the British South Asians in the study.
Religion: Figure 4-4 depicts the breakdown of respondents by religion. Most of the study's
participants identified themselves as Muslim. The survey was completed by 193 (53.8%)
Muslims, 71 (19.8 %) Christians, and 62 (17.3%) people who claimed they had no religious
affiliation. The study was also completed by 21(5.8%) Hindus, 3 (.8%) Sikhs, and 1 (.3%)
Buddhist.
Education: Figure 4-5 depicts the level of education completed by the British participants. The
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questionnaire asked respondents to identify the highest level of education they had completed,
but the graph most likely represents the level of education the respondents had completed or
were pursuing at the time of the study. The survey was completed by 264 (73.5%) people who
claimed they had completed either college or a higher education.
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4.2 Survey Results at University of Bradford (White British and British South Asian
Muslims under 30 Years Old)
The survey results of all British respondents are found in Appendix C. However, only
those questionnaires completed by White British and British South Asian Muslim respondents
under 30 years old at the University of Bradford are included in the results below. This is
intended to reduce the influence of compounding variables, such as age and immigrant
generation, in the analysis. By looking only at this subset, the study had 188 surveys to use in
the analysis below, including the responses of 48 White British respondents and 140 British
South Asian Muslims.
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The questionnaire included nine independent questions, which are found in Table 4-1.
The responses to each survey question are presented individually below, allowing for those
surveys with some incomplete responses to be included where possible. A snapshot of the
results is found in Table 4-2.

Q1) Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family?
Q2) How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet, how
much do you plan to stress education to them?
Q3) The chart below describes 5 different educational goals, which educational goal is the most
important to you?
Basic Education: One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math
skills
Religious Education: One that provides students with strong values and strong religious
beliefs
Liberal Education: One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for
themselves
Vocational Education: One that prepares students to find a good job
Civic Education: One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and show
respect for the laws of his/her country
Q4) Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most important to
you?
Q5) Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the country?
Q6) How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?
Q7) How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?
Q8) Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?
Q9) Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?
Table 4-1: Survey Questions
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Survey Question

Q1: Growing Up, Level of
Emphasis Placed upon
Education

Q2: Level of Emphasis Placed
upon Education for their
Children

Responses
Key Finding (s)
Statistically
Different?
YES
88.65% of respondents had education
stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot";
however, British South Asian Muslims
were more likely than white respondents to
have had education stressed "a lot"
NO
96.69% of respondents stress education "a
fair amount" or a "lot" to their children, or
plan to when they have children

Q3: Educational Goals

YES

Q4: Achieve Educational
Goal?

NO

Q5: Equal Access to
Education?

NO

Q6: Ethnic Group has Equal
Access to Education?

YES

Q7: Religious Group has
Equal Access to Education?

YES

Q8: Part of British Society?

NO

Q9: Equal Member of Society?

YES

Educational goals were dependent upon
population; a religious education was the
most important goal of British South Asian
Muslims and a liberal education was the
most important goal of White British
respondents
90.43% of all respondents claimed they
were able to achieve their desired type of
education; for Muslim respondents,
achieving one's goal was dependent upon
the goal
89.58% of all respondents thought they had
equal access to education
British South Asian Muslims were less
likely to think members of their ethnic
background had equal access to education
(34.29% thought South Asians had less
access)
British South Asian Muslims were less
likely to think members of their religious
background had equal access to education
(28.78% thought Muslims had less access)
94.68% of respondents thought they were
part of British society
British South Asian Muslims were less
likely to think they were equal members of
British society (19.42% thought they were
not equal members of society)

Table 4-2: Comparison of Responses: White British and British South Asian Muslims under 30
Years Old, University of Bradford
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4.2.1 Q1: Growing Up, How Much was Education Stressed in Your Family?
Because the earliest South Asian immigrants to Bradford placed more emphasis on work
than education, the first survey question was designed to test claims that the immigrant
community has since placed greater emphasis upon education as a means of social mobility
(Shackle 2010). The question utilized a Likert rating scale, allowing respondents to choose one
of the following closed-ended responses: "not at all", "very little", "a fair amount", or "a lot".
The question was answered by 137 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British
respondents.
As seen in Table 4-3, most participants (88.65%) claimed education was stressed, or
emphasized, "a fair amount" or a "lot" in their youth. A statistical test for the difference between
the two population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were just as likely as
White British respondents to have had education stressed "a fair amount" or "a lot" by their
families (z = .292, p = .7707). However, British South Asian Muslim respondents were more
likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up
(z = 2.39, p = .0084) (See Table 4-4).

Growing Up, How Much was Education Stressed in Your Family?
Not At All
Very Little
A Fair
A Lot
Count
Amount
Row %
6
9
46
76
South Asian
4.38%
6.57%
33.58%
55.47%
Muslims, <30
1
5
25
17
White
2.08%
10.42%
52.08%
35.42%
British, <30
7
14
71
93
Total:
3.78%
7.57%
38.38%
50.27%
Table 4-3: Responses to Question 1

Total
137
48
185
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British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White Respondents to Have Had
Education Stressed "a Lot" While Growing Up
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British
respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up
HO: p1 ≤p2
H1: p1

p2

Test Statistic:

"a lot") 7 137
"a lot") 17 8
2.39; p-value= .0084
Decision Rule: one-tail test (right), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if
z > 1.645
Conclusion: Since 2.39 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British
respondents to have had education stressed "a lot" while growing up. Since the p-value is
between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating
the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null
hypothesis with a significance level of .01 (2.326).
Table 4-4: British South Asian Muslims More Likely to Have Had Education Stressed "A Lot"
4.2.2 Q2: How Much Do You Stress Education to Your Children, Or If You Do Not Have
Children Yet, How Much Do You Plan to Stress Education to Them?
The survey also sought to determine how much stress, or emphasis, the respondents
planned to place upon their children's education, or already did if they had children at the time of
the study. The question was intended to gauge how much the respondents value an education.
The question utilized the same Likert rating scale as the previous question: "not at all", "very
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little", "a fair amount", and "a lot". Respondents could also indicate they did not plan to have
children. The question was answered by 134 British South Asian Muslims and 47 White British
respondents. The vast majority (96.69%) of the respondents planned to emphasize education "a
fair amount" or "a lot" to their children (see Table 4-5). Although a greater proportion of British
South Asian Muslims emphasized, or planned to emphasize, education "a lot" to their children,
the difference in proportions was not statistically significant (z = 1.05, p = .1469)
How Much Do You Stress Education to Your Children, Or If You Do Not Have Children
Yet, How Much Do You Plan to Stress Education to Them?
Not At All Very Little
A Fair
A Lot
I Don't Plan
Total
Count
Amount
to Have
Row %
Children
2
3
46
83
0
134
South
1.49%
2.24%
34.33%
61.94%
0.00%
Asian
Muslims,
<30
0
0
21
25
1
47
White
0.00%
0.00%
44.68%
53.19%
2.13%
British,
<30
2
3
67
108
1
181
Total:
1.10%
1.66%
37.02%
59.67%
0.55%
Table 4-5: Responses To Question 2

4.2.3 Q3: Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?
This question was based on Nelson's (2003) study of educational priorities in Rawalpindi,
Pakistan. Using the definitions in Table 4-6, Nelson asked Pakistani parents to prioritize their
educational goals for their children. Borrowing from Nelson, this study asked respondents to
identify their educational goals based upon the definitions in Table 4-7. The question was
answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. According to a
chi-square test of independence, the respondents' educational goals were dependent upon ethnic
group (x2 = 22.891, p = .0001) (see Table 4-9). For example, British South Asian Muslims were
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more likely than white respondents to identify a religious education as the most important goal of
an education (z = 3.576, p = .0002). By contrast, White British respondents were more likely
than British South Asian Muslims to identify a liberal education as the most important
educational goal (z = 3.47, p = .0003) (see Tables 4-10 and 4-11).

Nelson's (2006) Definitions of a "Good" Education
Basic Education: "Some people say that a good school teaches students how to read
and write. In other words, good schools provide students with
basic reading skills and basic math skills."
Religious Education: "Some people say that a good school is a school that creates good
Muslims. In other words, good schools provide students with
strong values and strong religious beliefs."
Liberal Education: "Some people say that good schools teach students how to solve
problems and think for themselves."
Vocational Education: "Some people say that good schools prepare students to find good
jobs."
Civic Education: "Some people say that good schools make sure that every student
becomes a good citizen, showing respect for the laws of their
country."
Table 4-6: Nelson's Definitions of a "Good" Education
Educational Goals Included on Study Questionnaire
Basic Education: One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic
math skills
Religious Education: One that provides students with strong values and strong religious
beliefs
Liberal Education: One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for
themselves
Vocational Education: One that prepares students to find a good job
Civic Education: One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and
shows respect for the laws of his/her country
Table 4-7: Educational Goals Used on This Survey
4.2.4 Q4: Do You Feel As If You Are/Were Able to Achieve the Type of Education that is
Most Important to You?
Based upon the Muslim community's struggles to meet some of its demands in the
education sector, the survey asked respondents whether they were able to achieve the type of
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Count
Row %
South
Asian
Muslims,
<30
White
British, <30
Total:

Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocational
Civic
Education Education
Education
Education
Education
14
41
35
28
22
10.00%
29.29%
25.00%
20.00%
15.71%

2
4.17%
16
8.51%

2
25
15
4.17%
52.09%
31.25%
43
60
43
22.87%
31.91%
22.87%
Table 4-8: Responses to Question 3

4
8.33%
26
13.83%

Total
140

48
188

education that was most important to them. The question was answered by 140 South Asian
Muslims and 48 White British respondents. As seen in Table 4-12, the vast majority (90.43%) of
respondents felt as if they were able to achieve the type of education that was most important to
them. A statistical test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates
British South Asian Muslims were just as likely as White British respondents to have felt like
they were able to achieve the type of education that was important to them (z = .23, p = .82).
However, within the Muslim sample, the achievement of one's educational goal was
dependent upon the respondent's goal (p = .006, see Table 4-14). Of the 49 British South Asian
Muslims who claimed a liberal or basic education was the most important goal of an education,
all claimed they were able to achieve it. By contrast, 32 of the 41 (78%) Muslims who stated a
religious education was their educational priority were able to achieve it. Of the 91 Muslims who
favored a religious, vocational, or civic education, 78 (85.7%) claimed they had achieved the
type of education they valued most.
4.2.5 Q5: Do You Feel as If You Have/Had as Much Access to Education as Anybody Else
in the Country?
This was the first of the survey's four questions intended to gauge the respondents'
perceptions of equality in British society. The question was answered by 140 British South
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Educational Goals Dependent Upon Ethnic Group
Goal: Test to see whether educational goals were dependent upon ethnicity (British South
Asian Muslim and White British)
HO: Educational goals are independent of ethnicity
H1: Education goals are dependent upon ethnicity
Test Statistic:

= 22.891; p-value= .0001

Decision Rule: For a significance level of .05, reject the null hypothesis if
9.488

>

0.05,4

or

Conclusion: Since 22.891 > 9.488, we reject the null hypothesis. There is enough evidence to
claim education goals are dependent upon ethnicity. Since the p-value is less than .001, there
is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test,
the test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level
of .005 (14.860).
Which educational goal is the most important to you? (Observed)
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocational
Civic
Count
Education Education
Education
Education
Education
Row %
14
41
35
28
22
South Asian
10.00%
29.29%
25.00%
20.00%
15.71%
Muslims,
<30
2
2
25
15
4
White
4.17%
4.17%
52.09%
31.25%
8.33%
British, <30
16
43
60
43
26
Total:
8.51%
22.87%
31.91%
22.87%
13.83%

Total
140

48
188

Which educational goal is the most important to you? (Expected)
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocationa
Civic
Expected
Education Education
Education
l
Education
Education
11.91
32.02
44.68
32.02
19.36
South Asian
Muslims,
<30
4.09
10.09
15.32
10.98
6.64
White
British, <30
Table 4-9: Educational Goals Dependent upon Ethnic Group
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British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White British Respondents to Favor a
Religious Education
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were more likely than White British
respondents to identify a religious education as the most important goal of an education
HO: p1 ≤p2
H1: p1 > p2
Test Statistic:

)
)

11 0
8

3.576; p-value= .0002
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z >1.645
Conclusion: Since 3.576 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslim respondents were more likely than
White British respondents to identify a religious education as their most important
educational goal. Since the p-value < .001, there is very strong evidence against the null
hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large
enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576).
Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who identified religious education as
their most important educational goal, n*p is less than 5, but n*(1-p) is greater than 5.
Table 4-10: British South Asian Muslims More Likely than White British to Favor a Religious
Education
Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. 163 (86.7%) of the respondents felt as if they
had as much access to education as anyone else in the country. While 10.42% of the White
British respondents felt like they had less access to education, 14.29% of the British South Asian
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Muslim respondents felt like they had less access. Although a higher proportion of British South
Asian Muslims felt as if they had less access to education, the difference in proportions was not
statistically significant (z = .681, p = .25).

White British Respondents More Likely than British South Asian Muslims to Favor a
Liberal Education
Goal: Test to see whether White British respondents were more likely than British South
Asian Muslims to identify a liberal education as the most important goal of an education
HO: p1 ≤p2
H1: p1 > p2
Test Statistic:

)

5 8
) 35 1 0

3.47; p-value= .0003
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis is >1.645
Conclusion: Since 3.47 > 1.640, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude White British respondents were more likely than British South
Asian Muslim respondents to identify a liberal education as their most important
educational goal. Since the p-value is less than .001, there is very strong evidence against
the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also
large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576).
Table 4-11: White British Respondents More Likely than South Asian Muslims to Favor a
Liberal Education
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Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type
of education that is most important to you?
Yes
No
Total
Count
Row %
127
13
140
South Asian
90.71%
9.29%
Muslims, <30
43
5
48
White British,
89.58%
10.42%
<30
170
18
188
Total:
90.43%
9.57%
Table 4-12: Responses to Question 4

Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to
education as anybody else in the country?
Yes
No
Total
Count
Row %
120
20
140
South Asian
85.71%
14.29%
Muslims, <30
43
5
48
White British,
89.58%
10.42%
<30
163
25
188
Total:
86.70%
13.30%
Table 4-13: Responses to Question 5
4.2.6 Q6: How Much Access to Education Do Most People of Your Ethnic Background
Have?
In addition to a question about the respondents' own access to education, the
questionnaire asked respondents if they thought members of their ethnic background had equal
access to education. The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48
White British respondents. While 3 (6.25%) of the White British respondents thought White
Britons had less access than others to education, 48 (34.29%) of the British South Asian Muslims
thought South Asians had less access. A test for the difference in proportions indicates British
South Asian Muslims were less likely than white respondents to think members of their ethnic
background had equal access to education (z = -2.67, p = .0038) (see Table 4-19).

103

For British South Asian Muslims, Achieving Educational Goals Dependent Upon Goal
Goal: Test to see whether achieving one's educational goal was dependent upon the
respondent's goal
HO: Educational goals are independent of population
H1: Education goals are dependent upon population
Test Statistic:

= 7.408 (Yates); p-value= .006

Decision Rule: For a significance level of .05, reject the null hypothesis if
3.841

>

0.05,1

or

Conclusion: Since 7.408 > 3.841, we reject the null hypothesis. There is enough evidence
to claim achieving one's educational goal was dependent upon the South Asian Muslim
respondent's educational goal. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong
evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test
statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .01
(6.635).
Do you feel as if you were able to achieve the type of education that is
most important to you? (Observed)
Yes
No
Total
Count
Row %
75
2
77
Basic/Liberal/Vocational
97.4%
2.6%
55.00%
Education
52
11
63
Religious/Civic
82.54%
17.46%
45.00%
Education
127
13
140
Total:
90.71%
9.29%
Do you feel as if you were able to achieve the type of education that is
most important to you? (Expected)
Yes
No
Expected
69.85
7.15
Basic/Liberal/Vocational Education
57.15
5.85
Religious/Civic Education
Table 4-14: For Muslims, Achieving Educational Goals Dependent upon Their Goals
4.2.7 Q7: How Much Access to Education Do Most People of Your Religious Affiliation
Have?
The third survey question related to equality in British society asked respondents whether
they thought their coreligionists had equal access to education. This question was answered by
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139 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. More than a quarter
(40/139, 28.8%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents thought Muslims had less access
to education, while only one (2%) White British respondent, who described himself as a
Christian, thought his coreligionists had less access to education. A test for the difference in
proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to think their coreligionists had equal access to education (z = -3.20, p = .0007) (see
Table 4-20).
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic
background have?
Less
More
Same
Total
Count
Access
Access
Access
Row %
48
8
84
140
South Asian
34.29%
5.71%
60.00%
Muslims,
<30
3
6
39
48
White
6.25%
12.50%
81.25%
British, <30
51
14
123
188
Total:
27.13%
7.45%
65.43%
Table 4-15: Responses to Question 6
How much access to education do most people of your religious
affiliation have?
Less
More
Same
N/A
Total
Count
Access
Access
Access
Row %
40
8
91
0
139
South Asian
28.78%
5.76%
65.47%
0.00%
Muslims,
<30
1
1
43
3
48
White
2.08%
2.08%
89.58%
6.25%
British, <30
41
9
134
3
187
Total:
21.93%
4.81%
71.66%
1.60%
Table 4-16: Responses to Question 7
4.2.8 Q8: Do You Personally Feel That You Are a Part of British Society?
Since 2001, Bradford's Muslim community has commonly been accused of segregating
itself from "mainstream" British society (Shaw 2002; Phillips 2006). Peach (2006) has also
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claimed the poor socioeconomic conditions of the British Muslim community isolate them from
society. As such, the survey asked respondents whether they felt as if they were part of British
society. The question was answered by 140 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British
respondents. The overwhelming majority of respondents (178/188, 94.68%) felt like they were
part of British society. Although a smaller proportion of Muslim respondents felt as if they were
part of society, a test for the difference between the two population proportions indicates British
South Asian Muslim respondents were just as likely as White British respondents to feel like
they were part of British society (z = 1.16, p = .123).
Do you personally feel that you are a part of British
society?
Yes
No
Total
Count
Row %
131
9
140
South Asian
93.57%
6.43%
Muslims, <30
47
1
48
White British,
97.92%
2.08%
<30
178
10
188
Total:
94.68%
5.32%
Table 4-17: Responses to Question 8
4.2.9 Q9: Do You Personally Feel That You Are an Equal Member of British Society?
In addition to asking respondents to identify whether they felt like part of society, the
survey asked respondents if they felt as if they were equal members of society. The question was
answered by 139 British South Asian Muslims and 48 White British respondents. While 131
(93.57% ) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents felt like they were part of society, only
112 (80.58%) thought they were equal members of society. By contrast 45 (93.75%) of the 48
White British respondents thought they were equal members of society. As seen in Table 4-21,
British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British respondents to feel like equal
members of society (z = -2.144p = .016.).
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Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of
British society?
Yes
No
Total
Count
Row %
112
27
139
South Asian Muslims,
80.58%
19.42%
<30
45
3
48
White British, <30
93.75%
6.25%
157
30
187
Total:
83.96%
16.04%
Table 4-18: Responses to Question 9
British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White Respondents to Think Members of
their Ethnic Background Had Equal Access to Education
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to think that members of their ethnic background had equal access to education
HO: p1 ≥ p2
H1: p1 < p2
Test Statistic:

)

8 1 0

)

39 8

-2.67; p-value= .0038
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z < -1.645
Conclusion: Since -2.76 < - 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to think members of their ethnic background had equal access to education.
Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is strong evidence against the null
hypothesis.
Table 4-19: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British to Think Members of
their Ethnicity Had Equal Access to Education
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British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Think
Their Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education
Goal: Test to see whether South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to think members of their faith had equal access to education
HO: p1 ≤ p2
H1: p1 < p2
Test Statistic:

)

91 139

)

3 8

-3.20; p-value= .0007
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z < -1.645
Conclusion: Since -3.20 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to think that their coreligionists had equal access to education. Since the p-value
is less than .001, there is very strong evidence against the null hypothesis. The test statistic
(z) is also small enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .005 (2.576).
Table 4-20: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Think
Their Coreligionists Had Equal Access to Education
4.3 Analysis and Discussion
4.3.1 The Local, Religious, and National Identities of Bradford's Immigrant Muslim
Community
In addition to the nine survey questions, the questionnaire asked respondents to describe
themselves. As seen in Table 4-22, the survey included a checklist with local, regional, and
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British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White Respondents to Feel Like Equal
Members of Society
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to see themselves as equal members of British society
HO: p1 ≥ p2
H1: p1 < p2
Test Statistic:

)

11 139

)

5 8

-2.144; p-value= .016
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if
z < -1.645
Conclusion: Since -2.144 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to feel like equal members of society. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05,
there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of
the test, the test statistic (z) is also significant enough to reject the null hypothesis with a
significance level of .025 (-1.960).
Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who perceived they were equal
members of British society, n*p is greater than 5, but n*(1-p) is less than 5.
Table 4-21: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely to Feel Like Equal Members of Society
national identities which the respondents could choose. It also included regional and national
identities common to Bradford's immigrant communities. In addition to the close-ended
responses on the checklist, respondents had the option to write in other identities not listed on the
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questionnaire.
Respondents were asked to describe themselves twice. The first time, respondents were
directed to select as many identities as applied. The second time, respondents were instructed to
select only one response. The pairing of questions was designed to gain insight into the
respondents' nested, or hyphenated, identities. Forcing them to subsequently select only one
identity was intended to determine the respondents' primary, or dominant, identities.

How you describe yourself? (Choose all that apply)
 Asian
 Atheist
 Bangladeshi
 Bradfordian
 Buddhist  Christian
 English
 European
 Indian
 Jewish
 Jullunduri
 Mirpuri
 Pakistani  Sikh
 South Asian
 Sylheti
Yorkshire(wo)man
 Other_____________

 British
 Hindu
 Muslim

Table 4-22: Identities Included on the Survey
The National Identity of British South Asian Muslims
One of this study's primary objectives was to determine whether young British South
Asian Muslims identified with the nation. Figure 4-6 depicts the number of respondents who
selected each identity on the checklist, and demonstrates the gambit of identities found amongst
Bradford's South Asian Muslim community. As hypothesized, most young British South Asian
Muslim respondents identified with the nation. When multiple identities were allowed, 105 of
the 140 (75%) British South Asian Muslim respondents identified themselves as British or
English.
A smaller sample collected elsewhere in Bradford also demonstrated the propensity for
young British South Asian Muslims to identify with the nation; however, they were less likely
than the respondents at the university to identify with the nation (z = -1.926, p = .0271). Of 17
British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old who completed the survey elsewhere in
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Bradford, only 9 (52.94%) described themselves as British or English. It is thought the British
South Asian Muslims at the university were more likely to identify with the nation because, as
university students, they had probably enjoyed more opportunities than most other young
Muslims in Bradford.
How Do British South Asian Muslim Respondents Describe
Themselves? (When Multiple Responses Allowed)
n=140
124
93

90

52

42

Jullunduri

1

8
Other

Jewish

3

Sylheti

Indian

0

South Asian

0

Sikh

0

Pakistani

9

Muslim

0

Mirpuri

9

Hindu

Christian

24

European

0
English

0
Buddhist

Bangladeshi

British

2
Bradfordian

0
Atheist

31

Yorkshireman

77

Asian

140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0

Figure 4-6: Local, National, and Religious Identities (Multiple Responses Allowed)
While this study hypothesized most young British South Asian Muslims would identify
with the nation, it was thought they would be less likely than white respondents to describe
themselves as British or English. Whereas 105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims at the
university identified with the nation, 43 (93.75%) of 45 White British respondents described
themselves as British or English. As hypothesized, a test for the difference between the two
population proportions demonstrates British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White
British respondents to identify with the nation (z = -2.730, p = .0032) (see Table 4-23).
As seen in Figure 4-6, this study also found British South Asian Muslims more
commonly described themselves as British rather than English. While 93 (66.4%) of the British
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South Asian Muslim respondents described themselves as British, only 31 (22.1%) described
themselves as English. By contrast, the study found White British respondents more commonly
described themselves as English. Of the 48 White British respondents at the university, 38
(79.2%) described themselves as English, while 33 (68.8%) described themselves as British. A
test for the statistical difference between the two population proportions demonstrates White
British respondents were more likely than British South Asian Muslims to describe themselves
as English (z = 7.073, p < .0001).
This finding was subsequently corroborated by the 2011 Census of England and Wales
that asked respondents about their national identity. Geospatial analysis of the census shows
White British Bradfordians identified more strongly with being English than British.
Conversely, Pakistani Bradfordians identified more strongly with being British. The bivariate
maps in Figures 4-7 and 4-8 plot the White British population and where English and British
identities were strongest in Bradford District. In the census output areas with large white
populations, English identity was the strongest while British identity was low. In contrast, the
bivariate maps in Figures 4-9 and 4-10 plot the Pakistani population and where English and
British identities were the strongest. In census output areas with high Pakistani populations,
British identity was the strongest while English identity was low. Linear regression confirms
these relationships, as seen in Figures 4-11 and 4-12.
The propensity for British South Asian Muslims to more readily describe themselves as
British suggests "British" is a more inclusive identity than "English", which likely has more
ethnic and ancestral overtones. As Colley (2009) has demonstrated how the British identity was
able to subsume the English, Welsh, and Scottish under one national identity in the 18th century,
so too has it been able to incorporate diverse immigrants in the 20th and 21st centuries. Because
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British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Identify
with the Nation
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to describe themselves as British or English
HO: p1 ≥p2
H1: p1 < p2
Test Statistic:

)
105 1 0
)
5 8
-2.730 p-value= .0032
Decision Rule: One-tailed (left-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if
z < -1.645
Conclusion: Since -2.730 < -1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to describe themselves as British or English. Since the p-value is between .001
and .01, there is strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance
of the test, the test statistic (z) is also small enough to reject the null hypothesis with a
significance level of .005 (-2.576).
Note: For the proportion of White British respondents who identified with the nation, n*p is
greater than 5, but n*(1-p) is less than 5.
Table 4-23: British South Asian Muslims Less Likely than White British Respondents to Identify
with the Nation
a common national identity is thought to reduce both in-group bias and social tension, the British
identity shared by both the South Asian and white communities will encourage those who seek to
better integrate immigrant communities into British society. However, the ongoing process of
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Figure 4-7: White British Population and English Identity (Bivariate Map)

Figure 4-8: White British Population and British Identity (Bivariate Map)
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Figure 4-9: Pakistani Population and English Identity (Bivariate Map)

Figure 4-10: Pakistani Population and British Identity (Bivariate Map)
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English Identity Dependent Upon Percent of White British Population in Output Area
2011 Census
100%
90%
80%
70%
English
60%
Identity
50%
(% of Output
40%
Area)
30%
20%
10%
0%

y = 0.6807x + 0.1891
% of Output Area
who Identified as
English

0%

50%

100%

White British Population as % of Output Area (Wh BR P.)
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R
R Square
Adjusted R Square
Standard Error
Observations

0.975683647
0.951958578
0.951927097
0.048721087
1528

ANOVA
df
Regression
Residual
Total

1
1526
1527
Coefficients

Intercept

0.18912

SS
71.77789
3.622334
75.40022
Standard
Error

t Stat

0.00296 63.841

MS
71.77789
0.002374

Pvalue

F
30238.25577

Lower
95%

0 0.1833

Upper
95%
0.1949

Significance F
0

Lower
95.0%

Upper
95.0%

0.1833 0.194

Wh_BR_P.
0.68072 0.00391 173.89
0 0.6730
0.6884 0.6730 0.688
Figure 4-11: English Identity Depends Upon Presence of White British Population
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British Identity Dependent Upon Percent of Pakistani Population in Output Area
2011 Census
90%
80%
70%
60%
y = 0.5619x + 0.2549

50%
British
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devolution in the UK threatens this shared national identity as English, Scottish, and Welsh
national identities become more salient amongst the white population.
The British-Muslim Hyphenated Identity
Some within the Muslim community have claimed that Islam and British culture are
incompatible. Likewise, some have concluded that British and Muslim identities are
irreconcilable. For example, the Islamist organization Hizb-ut-Tahrir (HT), which has a
presence at the University of Bradford3, has claimed on its recruitment videos:
Muslims in this country need to answer some very serious questions. Where does their
allegiance lie?... I think Muslims in this country need to take a long, hard look at
themselves and decide what is their identity. Are they British or are they Muslim? I am
Muslim. Where I live is irrelevant. (BBC News 2003)
While some, like the HT, claim Muslim and British identities are mutually exclusive, this study
found most Muslims at the university have reconciled these identities, laying claim to both. Of
the 124 British South Asian Muslims who described themselves as Muslim, 96 (77.4%) of them
also described themselves as British or English.
Muslim as the Dominant Identity
Allowing respondents to choose multiple identities revealed their nested, or hyphenated,
identities. To determine the respondents' dominant, or most important, identities, the survey
forced respondents to select one identity. Figure 4-13 depicts the number of British South Asian
Muslim respondents who identified with each identity when they were forced to choose only
one. As hypothesized, the British South Asian Muslims' most important identity was their
Muslim identity. When forced to choose one identity, 78 (56.1%) of 139 British South Asian
Muslims described themselves as Muslim. Moreover, of the 96 British South Asian Muslims
3

According to Rashad Ali, a former HT member who sat on its national leadership committee,
the HT ran the University of Bradford's Islamic Society, a student organization that promotes
Islam on campus and aims to act as the voice of Muslim student at the university(Ali 2008).
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who described themselves as Muslim and either British or English, 58 (60.4%) subsequently
described themselves as Muslim, while 25 (26%) described themselves as British or English. Of
note, one of the respondents refused to choose between the two identities, instead writing in
"British-Muslim". This probably indicates the presence of the unique hybrid identity that some
Muslims, including Trevathan (2009), hope to create in Britain.
How Do British South Asian Muslim Respondents Describes
Themselves? (When One Response Allowed)
n=139
100
80
60
40
20
0

78
26
6

1

7

1

3

13

1

3

Figure 4-13: Local, National, and Religious Identities (One Response Allowed)
Continued Identification with South Asia
The study found young British South Asian Muslims continue to strongly identify with
South Asia. When multiple identities were allowed, this study found 124 (88.5%) of the 140
British South Asian Muslims described themselves using at least one "Asian" identity (meaning
they described themselves as Pakistani, Mirpuri, Sylheti, South Asian, Asian, Bangladeshi,
Indian, or Jullunduri). Of the 140 British South Asian Muslims in the study, 90 (64.3%)
described themselves as Pakistani, while 77 (55%) described themselves as Asian. This study
also found local Pakistani identities remain important to the community, as 24 (17.1%)
respondents described themselves as Mirpuri. Although accounts of young British South Asian
Muslims suggest their ties with South Asia are not as strong as those of their parents, family ties
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and visits to the subcontinent likely explain in part their continued identification with South
Asia.
Although this study demonstrated young British South Asian Muslims still strongly
identify with Asia, only 3 (2.1%) of the 140 British South Asian respondents described
themselves as South Asian. This is in keeping with Dash's (2008) study of South Asian
regionalism that found the South Asian regional identity was still underdeveloped. Dash found
Pakistanis were the least likely of the five South Asian nationalities he studied (Bangladeshi,
Indian, Nepali, Pakistani and Sri Lankan) to think of themselves as citizens of South Asia. In his
study, only 12% of Pakistanis saw themselves as "South Asian" (Dash 2008).
4.3.2 Association between Equality and National Identity
It is commonly thought that the nation is predicated upon the ideal that its members enjoy
equality in legal, civic, and political affairs (Smith 1991). However, Shulman (2003) argues
there is little empirical evidence to support the theory that equality promotes national identity. In
his own study, Shulman found poorer members of society were slightly more likely than
wealthier members to identify with the nation.
Given Shulman's claim, this study sought to test for an association between perceptions
of equality and national identity. To do this, the questionnaire utilized four measures of equality.
In addition to directly asking respondents whether they saw themselves as equal members of
society, the survey asked them about their educational access, as well as the access of those
within their ethnic and religious backgrounds. Access to education was used as a key barometer
of equality because of the known disparity in educational qualifications and opportunities in
Bradford.
This study found perceptions of inequality and discrimination were high amongst the
British South Asian Muslim population. Nearly 1 in 5 (19.4%) young British South Asian
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Muslim respondents saw themselves as unequal members of society, compared to just 3(6.3%) of
the 48 White British respondents. This study also found more than half (79/140, 56.4%) of the
British South Asian Muslim respondents felt like they or members of their ethnic or religious
backgrounds were discriminated against.4 By contrast, 10 (20.8%) of 48 White British
respondents felt like they or members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds had been
discriminated against.
Even though British South Asian Muslims were less likely than White British
respondents to identify with the nation, this study found an association between perceptions of
inequality, or discrimination, and national identity. It found those Muslims who saw themselves
as equal members of society, or had not experienced discrimination, were more likely to identify
with the nation. British South Asian Muslims were more likely to identify with the nation if they
felt like they were equal members of society (z = 2.192, p = .0142), thought they had equal
access to education (z = 1.673, p = .0472), or thought South Asians had equal access to education
(z = 2.507, p = .0061). Collectively, those who had not experienced or witnessed discrimination
were also more likely to identify with the nation, as seen in Table 4-24. This finding is in line
with other studies, including studies by Loden (2008) and Robinson (2009) that found the
absence of discrimination was key in determining whether immigrants identified with the nation.
The key findings from the four tests for association are discussed below, but also summarized in
Table 4-25.

4

This represents respondents who felt they were unequal members of society, had less access to
education, thought members of their ethnic background had less access to education or thought
members of their religious background had less access to education
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Absence of Discrimination Promoted National Identity among Young British South
Asian Muslims
Goal: Test to see whether young British South Asian Muslims who had not experienced or
witnessed discrimination were more likely to identify with the nation
HO: p1 ≤p2
H1: p1 > p2
Test Statistic:

)

51/61

)

5 79

2.0677; p-value= .0194
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z > 1.645
Conclusion: Since 2.067> 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who had not experienced or
witnessed discrimination against members of their ethnic or religious backgrounds were
more likely to identify with the nation than those who experienced or witnessed
discrimination. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the test statistic (z) is also large
enough to reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (1.960). As the p value
is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence against the null hypothesis.
Table 4-24: Absence of Discrimination Promoted National Identity
Equal Members of British Society and National Identity
As hypothesized, this study found British South Asian Muslims were generally less likely
than White British respondents to identify with the nation (z = -2.730, p = .0032). However, this
study also found that British South Asian Muslims who saw themselves as equal members of
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Summary of Associations: Measures of Equality and National Identity (British South
Asian Muslims Under 30 Years Old, University of Bradford)
Measure of Equality
Association Between
Key Finding (s)
Measure of Equality
and National
Identity?
(significance level of α
= .05)
Perceived Equal Access to
YES
Of those who thought they had equal
Education
access to an education, 78%
identified with the nation; 60% of
those who thought they had unequal
access identified with the nation
Perceived Ethnicity Had
YES
Of those who thought South Asians
Same Access to Education
had equal access to an education,
82% identified with the nation; 63%
of those who thought South Asians
had less access identified with the
nation
Perceived Coreligionists Had
NO
Of those who thought Muslims had
Same Access to Education
equal access to an education, 75%
identified with the nation; 75% of
those who thought Muslims had less
access identified with the nation
Perceived Self as Equal
YES
Of those who thought they were
Member of British Society
equal members of society, 79%
identified with the nation; 59% of
those who thought they were unequal
identified with the nation
Table 4-25: Summary of Associations between Measures of Equality and National Identity
society more readily identified with the nation than those who thought they were unequal. The
study found 89 of the 112 (79.46%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who saw
themselves as equal members of society identified with the nation. By contrast, 16 of the 27
(59.26%) British South Asian Muslims who felt like they were unequal members of society
described themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-14). As seen in Table 4-26, the
difference in proportions is statistically significant, demonstrating those who see themselves as
equal members of society are more likely to identify with the nation (z = 2.192, p = .0142).
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Figure 4-14: Equal Member of Society and National Identity
Equal Access to Education and National Identity
As seen in Table 4-27, this study found British South Asian Muslim respondents who
thought they had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than
those who thought they had unequal access (z = 1.673, p = .0472). The study found 93 of the
120 (77.50%) British South Asian Muslims who felt as if they had equal access to education
identified with the nation. By contrast, 12 of the 20 (60%) British South Asian Muslim
respondents who thought they had unequal access described themselves as British or English
(see Figure 4-15).
Ethnic Group's Access to Education and National Identity
As seen in Table 4-28, this study found British South Asian Muslims who thought South
Asians had equal access to education were more likely to identify with the nation (z = 2.507, p =
.0061). The study found 69 of the 84 (82.14%) British South Asian Muslim respondents who
thought South Asians had equal access to education identified with the nation. By contrast, 30 of
the 48 (62.5%) British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had less access to
education identified themselves as British or English (see Figure 4-16).
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British South Asian Muslims who Thought They Were Equal Members of Society were
More Likely to Identify with the Nation
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought they were equal
members of society were more likely to describe themselves as British or English than those
who thought they were unequal
HO: p1 ≤p2
H1: p1 > p2
Test Statistic:

)

89 11

)

1

7

2.192; p-value= .0142
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z > 1.645
Conclusion: Since 2.192> 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought they were equal
members of society were more likely to identify with the nation than those who did not feel
like equal members of society. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate
evidence against the null hypothesis. The test statistic (z) is also large enough to reject the
null hypothesis with a significance level of .025 (1.960).
Table 4-26: British South Asian Muslims who Thought they were Equal Members of Society
were More Likely to Identify with the Nation
Religious Group's Access to Education and National Identity
Although 40 (29%) of 139 British South Asian Muslim respondents thought Muslims had
less access to an education, it had no bearing on their identification with the nation. The study
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British South Asian Muslims who Thought They Had Equal Access to Education were
More Likely to Identify with the Nation
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought they had equal access to
an education were more likely to describe themselves as British or English than those who
thought they had less access
HO: p1 ≤p2
H1: p1 > p2
Test Statistic:

)

93 1 0
)

1

0

1.673; p-value= .0472
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z > 1.645
Conclusion: Since 1.673 is > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought they had equal access to
education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought they had less
access to education. Since the p-value is between .01 and .05, there is moderate evidence
against the null hypothesis.
Table 4-27: British South Asian Muslims who Thought they had Equal Access to Education
More Likely to Identify with the Nation
found 68 (74.73%) of the 91 British South Asian Muslim respondents who thought Muslims had
equal access to education identified with the nation. By contrast, 30 (75%) of the 40 British
South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education described themselves as
British or English (see Figure 4-17). As seen in Table 4-29, the difference between the
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British South Asian Muslims who Thought South Asians Had Equal Access to
Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had the
same access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who
thought South Asians had less access
HO: p1 = p2
H1: p1

p2

Test Statistic:
Size, British South Asian Muslims who Felt Like Ethnic Group Had Same
Access) = 84

)

98

) 30 8
2.507; p-value= .0061
Decision Rule: One-tailed (right-tailed), for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null
hypothesis if z > 1.645
Conclusion: Since 2.507 > 1.645, we reject the null hypothesis. At the 5% level of
significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought South Asians had equal
access to education were more likely to identify with the nation than those who thought
South Asians had less access to education. Since the p-value is between .001 and .01, there is
strong evidence against the null hypothesis. Demonstrating the significance of the test, the
test statistic (z) is large enough to also reject the null hypothesis with a significance level of
.001 (2.326).
Table 4-28: British South Asian Muslims who Thought South Asians had Equal Access to
Education were More Likely to Identify with the Nation
population proportions was not statistically significant (z =-.033, p = .9737). As a result, this
study concluded British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access to education
were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had equal access.
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National Identity Not Dependent Upon Perceiving Coreligionists Had Equal Access to
Education
Goal: Test to see whether British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims had less access
to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who thought Muslims had
less access
HO: p1 = p2
H1: p1

p2

Test Statistic:
ize, British South Asian Muslims who Thought Most Muslims Had Equal
Access) = 91

)

8 91

) 30 0
-.033; p-value= .9737
Decision Rule: Two-tail test, for a significance level (α) of .05, reject the null hypothesis if z
< - 1.960 or > 1.960
Conclusion: Since -.033 is not less than -1.960, we do not reject the null hypothesis. At the
5% level of significance, we conclude British South Asian Muslims who thought Muslims
had equal access to education were just as likely to identify with the nation as those who
thought Muslims had less access. Since the p-value is greater than .1, there is little evidence
against the null hypothesis.
Table 4-29: National Identity Not Dependent Upon Perceiving Coreligionists Had Equal Access
to Education
4.3.3 Acculturation: Integration, Assimilation, Separation and Marginalization
Berry (1997) claims immigrants can adopt one of four acculturation strategies when
interacting with others in their host society. Depending on how immigrants value both
maintaining their own cultural identities and having relations with members of the host society,
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Figure 4-15: Equal Access to Education and National Identity

Figure 4-16: Ethnic Group's Access to Education and National Identity

Figure 4-17: Religious Group's Access to Education and National Identity
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immigrants can choose one of four strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation, or
marginalization (Berry 1997). A matrix depicting how these values and strategies intersect is
seen in Figure 4-18. Immigrants who want to maintain their own cultural identities as well as
interact with the host society tend to integrate, while those who only value relations with the
larger society tend to assimilate. Conversely, those who emphasize the maintenance of their own
cultural identities without desiring to interact with the host society tend to seek segregation.
Those immigrants who neither seek to maintain their own cultural identities nor adopt those of
the host society pursue marginalization.

(Berry 1997)
Figure 4-18: Immigrant Acculturation Strategies According to Berry
Over the years, Muslims in Bradford have been accused of segregating themselves from
"mainstream" British society. Indeed, the building up and clustering of Asian businesses, shops,
restaurants, schools, places of worship, and funeral homes allows the city's South Asian
communities, if they so choose, to go from cradle to grave without the need to meaningfully
interact with the majority white population. Despite ethnic clustering in Bradford, Phillips
(2006) argues the city's Muslim community wants to be better integrated into British society.
She, like Kundnani (2001), argues the city's ethnic clustering is due to institutional
discrimination in the housing market as well as the Muslims' desire for the support and
protection associated with living near other South Asians.
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To determine whether the Muslim community in Bradford more commonly demonstrates
indicators of integration or segregation, this study adapted Berry's matrix to see which
acculturation strategies were being employed by young Muslims in the city. In this analysis,
respondents were assessed to have pursued integration if they described themselves using
identities associated with both the immigrant community and British society. Those respondents
who described themselves using only "local" identities were assessed to have pursued
assimilation, while respondents who identified themselves using only identities common to the
immigrant community were assessed to have adopted a strategy of segregation. Lastly, those
respondents who did not use identities common to either British society or the immigrant
community were assessed to have pursued marginalization. Table 4-30 depicts how the
acculturation strategy of each respondent was inferred based upon their descriptions of
themselves.

Picture 4-1: Example of the businesses serving the Muslim community in Bradford, Muslim
Funeral Service on Darfield Street (Reid, 2010)
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Picture 4-2: Jamiyat Tabligh-ul-Islam Central Mosque, built in 1995. The mosque sits off Lumb
Lane, opposite the Muslim Funeral Service pictured above and less than 500m from the Pakistani
Consulate (Reid, 2010)

Picture 4-3: Another example of the businesses serving the Muslim community, Raja's Pizza
serves samposas and the "Tastiest Halal Pizza Ever" (Reid, 2010)
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Picture 4-4: South Asian females walking down terraced street in Manningham where Muslims
constitute the majority. Muslims claim they continue to live in Muslim enclaves because of the
mutual support it provides (Reid, 2010)
Analysis of the survey data reveals most British South Asian Muslims at the university
have integrated into British society. Of the 140 British South Asian Muslim respondents, 114
(81.4%) described themselves using identities associated with both the immigrant community
and British society. Separation, or segregation, was the second most common strategy observed,
and was seen in 22 (15.7%) of the British South Asian Muslim respondents. Assimilation, or the
adoption of only British identities, was identified in only 4 (2.9%) of the respondents. None of
the respondents exhibited traits of marginalization.
A smaller sample of surveys collected elsewhere in Bradford revealed similar proportions
amongst young British South Asian Muslims in the city. Of 17 young British South Asian
Muslims surveyed elsewhere in Bradford, 11 (64.7%) showed signs of integration, while 5
( 9. %) demonstrated signs of segregation. Using a significance level of α

.05, a chi-square
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test for independence confirmed that the acculturation strategies were not statistically different
(x2 = 1.314 with Yates correction, p = .2516). This suggests the acculturation strategies seen at
the university are probably representative of those in the city's wider South Asian Muslim
community.
These study results differed from those in Robinson's (2009) study of Pakistani Muslim
and Indian Hindu adolescents in Birmingham and Leicester. While Robinson found Indian
adolescents favored integration, she found separation was the most common acculturation
strategy amongst Pakistani adolescents. The differing results may be due to differences in the
study populations. Robinson conducted her study amongst secondary school students, while this
study focused on university students and other university-aged respondents.
4.3.4 Education and the British South Asian Muslim Community in Bradford
Bradford's Muslim population has achieved a disproportionately low level of educational
qualifications. In 2001, more than half (50.7%) of all Muslim adults in Bradford had none
(Office for National Statistics 2001c). Factors known to contribute to the Muslim community's
lack of qualifications include their extended absences from school and limited proficiency in
English (Lewis 2007). The socio-economic conditions of the earliest Muslim immigrants has
also been cited as a contributing factor, as has the first immigrants' emphasis on work over
education as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010).
Because education was not emphasized at first by the earliest South Asian Muslim
immigrants to Bradford, this study sought to test claims that education has since become more
valued as a means of social mobility (Shackle 2010). If a continued undervaluation of education
was found, it would help to further explain the community's education gap. However, this study
found the vast majority of British South Asian Muslim respondents valued education. Of 137
British South Asian Muslim respondents, 122 (89%) claimed education was emphasized "a fair
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Integration
Identities
Commonly
Associated with
Immigrant
Community
Asian
Bangladeshi
Indian
Jullunduri
Mirpuri
Muslim
Pakistani
South Asian
Sylheti

Identities
Commonly
Associated with
British Society

&

British
Bradfordian
English
European
Yorkshireman

Count (Percentage)
114/140 (81.4%)
Separation/Segregation
Identities Commonly Associated with
Immigrant Community
Asian
Bangladeshi
Indian
Jullunduri
Mirpuri
Muslim
Pakistani
South Asian
Sylheti

Assimilation
Identities Commonly Associated with British
Society

British
Bradfordian
English
European
Yorkshireman

Count (Percentage)
4/140 (2.9%)
Marginalization
Identities Not Commonly Associated with
Immigrant Community or British Society

Other

Count (Percentage)
Count (Percentage)
22/140 (15.7%)
0/140 (0.00%)
Table 4-30: Identities Used to Infer Acculturation Strategies
amount" or "a lot" in their families. Moreover, 129 (96.3%) of 134 British South Asian Muslim
respondents intended to emphasize education "a fair amount" or "a lot" to their children.
One might expect most university students to have had education emphasized to them,
regardless of their ethnic or religious background. However, this study found British South
Asian Muslims were more likely than White British respondents to have had education stressed
"a lot" to them by their families (z = 2.39, p = .0084). Demonstrating the value of an education
135

to the Muslim community, more than 55% of the British South Asian Muslim respondents at the
university had education emphasized "a lot" to them, while only 35% of the White British
respondents at the university had education stressed "a lot" to them in their youth.
Because most Muslims in Bradford have no educational qualifications, the sample at the
university may not have represented the wider Muslim community's views on education.
However, the surveys conducted elsewhere in Bradford suggest education is probably valued by
most Muslim families in the city. Of 24 surveys completed by British South Asian Muslims
elsewhere in Bradford, 21 (87.5%) indicated education was stressed to them "a fair amount" or
"a lot" while growing up. Using a significance level of α

.05, a two-tailed statistical test for the

difference in population proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims elsewhere in
Bradford were just as likely as those at the university to have had education stressed "a fair
amount" or "a lot" in their youth (z = .222, p = .824). This suggests the level of emphasis placed
upon an education by the families of university students likely mirrors the emphasis that the
wider Muslim community places upon an education.
This study also explored the educational demands, or preferred goals, of Bradford's
Muslim community. Based upon Nelson's (2003) study in Rawalpindi that demonstrated
Pakistani families favored civic and religious educations, this study hypothesized that the
educational goals of Bradford's Muslim community would differ from those of the White British
majority. It was thought the British South Asian Muslims' goals would reflect the findings in
Nelson's study.
As in Nelson's study in Pakistan, the most common educational goal identified by British
South Asian Muslims in Bradford was a religious education, defined as an education that
provides students with strong values and strong religious beliefs. In this study, 41 (29.29%) of
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the 140 British South Asian Muslim respondents identified a religious education as being the
most important goal of an education. A liberal education, defined in this study as an education
that teaches students how to solve problems and think for themselves, was the second most
common response, and was identified as a priority by 35 (25%) of the British South Asian
Muslim respondents.
By contrast, a liberal education was the priority for the majority of White British
respondents. This study found more than half (25/48, 52.09%) of the White British respondents
identified a liberal education as the most important goal of an education. Furthermore, only 2
(4.17%) of the white respondents claimed a religious education was their educational priority.
The white respondents' preference for a liberal education corresponds with the stated
aims of the National Curriculum. While the National Curriculum is designed to reflect and
incorporate Britain's minority populations, including allowance for their religious education, the
Curriculum is ultimately designed to pass on the knowledge and values of society as influenced
primarily by the majority population. In this case, the basis of the National Curriculum is a
liberal education as championed by the Victorian school inspector and literary Matthew Arnold
(1822-1888), who was the first to propose a national curriculum in England (Conway 2010). It
was Arnold's belief that a liberal education was the most important goal of an education,
superseding religious, civic and vocational aims, as he argued:
The aim and office of instruction, say many people, is to make a man a good citizen, or a
good Christian or a gentleman; or it is to fit him to get on in the world, or it is to enable
him to do his duty in the state of life to which he is called. It is none of these, and the
modern spirit more and more discerns it to be none of these. These are at best secondary
and indirect aims of instruction; its prime direct aim is to enable a man to know himself
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… But it is also a vital and formative knowledge
to know the world, the laws which govern nature, and man as a part of nature. (Italics
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added for emphasis)(Conway 2010)
Despite the inclusion of religious and civic education in the current curriculum, a liberal
education still forms the basis of the National Curriculum today.
Based upon the findings in this study, it is suggested that the differing educational goals
of the white and immigrant Muslim communities may contribute to the latter's limited
educational qualifications. The National Curriculum, with a liberal education as its foundation,
may not appeal to those with differing educational goals, particularly if they feel like they are
unable to achieve them in state schools. All 49 of the British South Asian Muslim respondents
who claimed a liberal or basic education was their most important educational goal said they
were able to achieve the type of education that was most important to them. By contrast, 32
(78%) of the 41 Muslim respondents who stated a religious education was their top educational
priority claimed they were able to achieve their goal. Of the 91 Muslims who favored a
religious, vocational, or civic education, 78 (85.7%) claimed they had achieved the type of
education they valued most.
While the National Curriculum includes some provision for religious education, if the
Muslim students' demands for it are not being met in state schools, they have other options,
including seeking out a religious education in one of Bradford's increasing number of madrassas
and independent Muslim schools. As of 2013, an estimated 9,000 children in Bradford attended
a madrasa at least one hour several days a week, while Lewis (2007) claims they commonly
spend several hours each school day in a madrasa. In 2013, roughly 1,000 children also attended
an independent Muslim school in Bradford (Economist 2013a).
The pursuit of studies at the madrassas, though highly desired by Muslim families, may
actually contribute to the community's low level of educational qualifications. Lewis (2007) has
argued the time that Bradford's Muslim youth spend in the city's madrassas disrupts their
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mastery of English, which, in turn, has been observed to contribute to the Muslim community's
underachievement at school (Crace 2004; Katz 2002). The very time being spent in the
madrassas may also affect the students' performance at school if it subtracts from the time they
have available to do their other schoolwork. While this may be the case, further research is
required to determine if there is a relationship between time spent at the madrasa and the
students' performance at school.
Although this study found 9 (22%) of the 41 British South Asian Muslim respondents
who favored a religious education felt like they were unable to achieve it, the survey did not
include follow-up questions to determine why their educational goals were not being met.
Despite the provision of some religious education in state schools, it is possible their goals were
not realized because of the National Curriculum's primary focus on a liberal education.
Alternatively, it is just as likely their goals went unfulfilled because of the identified
shortcomings in the education provided by Bradford's madrassas.
The quality of education provided in Bradford's madrassas is said to be improving;
nevertheless, many of them reportedly offer their students only a very basic knowledge of Islam.
A 2013 study by Bradford's Council of Mosques concluded many of the city's madrassas have
only a "very narrow understanding of faith education," and are largely limited to assisting their
students to identify and read Qur'anic text, memorize the five pillars of Islam, and pray (Council
for Mosques 2013). The Council's study also highlighted the language barrier that is commonly
found in the city's madrassas. Although English is the primary language of many of the city's
youth, the teachers at the madrassas are commonly brought in from Pakistan and frequently have
little or no command of the language. The linguistic and cultural barriers between teacher and
student most likely limits the students' ability to learn and fully place into context the material
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being taught. The poor learning environment reported in many of the city's madrassas may
explain why some of the participants who favored a religious education also claimed they were
unable to attain it.
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Chapter 5 Conclusions, Implications, and Recommendations for Further Study
5.1 Key Findings and Implications
Key Findings
This study's primary objectives were to determine whether British South Asian Muslims
in Bradford identified with the nation and felt like they were equal members of British society.
In so doing, this study sought to test for an association between perceptions of equality and
national identity. Although the association between the two is commonly accepted in theory,
Shulman (2003) has argued there is little empirical data to support the theoretical link between
them. Table 5-1 provides a summary of the study's findings, while Table 5-2 summarizes how
the study's hypotheses were borne out by the study results.
As hypothesized, this study found most young British South Asian Muslims identified
with the nation. Of the 140 British South Asian Muslims under 30 years old who participated in
the study at the University of Bradford, 105 (75%) described themselves as British or English.
Importantly, this study also found an association between perceptions of equality and national
identity. The British South Asian Muslims who participated in this study were more likely to
identify with the nation if they felt like they were equal members of society (z = 2.192, p =
.0142), thought they had equal access to education (z = 1.673, p = .0472), or thought South
Asians had equal access to education (z = 2.507, p = .0061).
Implications
Finding an association between equality and national identity adds a layer of empirical
data to the literature to support Deutsch’s theory (19

) that equality promotes national identity.

More importantly, it has implications for policymakers, stakeholders, and community
powerbrokers who have worked to promote social cohesion in Bradford following outbreaks of
ethnic tension and violence in the city. Because a shared national identity is thought to reduce
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in-group bias and promote social cohesion, promoting equality and highlighting, or publicizing,
the British Muslims' identification with the nation may help to reduce social tension in the city.
Because the Conservative government has also linked "home grown" extremism to a lack
of the immigrants' integration at the local and national level, publicizing the Muslim
community’s attachment to the nation as identified in this study may also help to refute the
commonly held misconception that the British Muslim community does not identify with the
nation. Disputing these misperceptions is important because participants in the study identified
negative representations of the Muslim community in the media as having contributed to their
sense of exclusion from British society.
By 2020, it is projected that 50% of Bradford’s population will be under 5 years old
(University of Bradford 2013). The quickly changing demographics in Bradford will have major
implications for policymakers, not in the least in the education sector. With emerging choices in
the city’s education market as a result of the opening of independent Muslim schools,
policymakers will need to consider the educational preferences and demands of the community
when allocating scarce resources. This study provides invaluable insight into the educational
priorities of the city’s Muslim community. While a liberal education, which is the cornerstone of
the existing National Curriculum, is important to the Muslim community, so too are religious and
vocational educations. Educators and policymakers will need to find innovative ways to
incorporate these demands into the education that is offered in Bradford-area schools. Better
addressing and incorporating the community’s demands in the education sector would probably
encourage further community involvement and buy-in, which may increase qualification
attainment rates as a result. Conversely, failure to consider the community’s educational
priorities could work at cross-purposes with government efforts to integrate the community by
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giving them the impression they are being excluded from the education sector as has happened in
the past. It might also lead to higher enrollment in the city’s Muslim schools, which could
disrupt government efforts to better integrate the Muslim community if British South Asian
Muslim and White British children have even less interaction as a result.
5.2 Suggestions for Further Study


This study concluded a religious education was a priority for Muslims in Bradford.
The time Muslim youth spend in the city's madrassas may contribute to the
community's qualification gap if it detracts from their course work. However, further
studies are necessary to determine if there is a relationship between the time being
spent in the madrasa and the Muslim community's performance at school.



This study found Muslim respondents who favored a basic or liberal education were
able to achieve their educational demands. However, those who favored a religious
education were less likely to feel as if they had been able to achieve the type of
education they valued most. Further research is required to determine why they are
not achieving their educational goal. Possibilities include the National Curriculum's
focus on a liberal education and the identified shortcomings in the city's madrassas.
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Research Question

Findings amongst British South Asian Muslims under
30 Years Old at the University of Bradford

Do British South Asian
Muslims in Bradford identify
with the nation? Do they
identify themselves as English
or British?

105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified
with the nation, describing themselves as British or English;
93(66%) described themselves as British and 31(22%)
described themselves as English

What are the British South
Asian Muslims dominant, or
most important, identities?

When forced to select only one identity, the three most
common identities were: Muslim (78, 56%), British (26,
19%), and Pakistani (13, 9%). Of 96 respondents who
described themselves as Muslim and identified with the
nation, 58 (60%) subsequently described themselves as
Muslim, and 25 (26%) as British or English

Is there an association
between perceptions of
equality and national
identity?

Using a significance level of α .05, those who thought
they were equal members of society were more likely to
identify with the nation (p = .0142). Those who thought
they had equal access to education were also more likely to
identify with the nation (p = .0472), as were those who
thought South Asians had equal access to an education
(p = .0061)

Is education important to
young British South Asian
Muslims, and what are their
educational goals? Have they
been able to achieve the type
of education that is most
important to them?

Nearly 9 in 10 British South Asian Muslim respondents
claimed education was stressed to them a "fair amount" or a
"lot" while growing up. The British South Asian Muslims'
educational goals differed from those of the White British
respondents. The most common goal identified by British
South Asian Muslim respondents was a religious education
(41, 29%), followed by liberal (35, 25%), vocational (28,
20%), civic (22, 16%), and basic (14, 10%) educations. All
of those who identified a liberal or basic education claimed
they were able to achieve it; 32 (78%) of 41 respondents
who favored a religious education felt like they were unable
to achieve their educational goal

What acculturation strategies
have been adopted by young
British South Asian Muslims
in Bradford? Have they
integrated into British
society?

114 (81%) British South Asian Muslims demonstrated
indicators of integration, having described themselves with
identities common to both the immigrant community and
British society. Separation, or segregation, was identified in
22 (15.7%) respondents, while 4 (2.9%) of the respondents
demonstrated signs of assimilation.

Table 5-1: Research Questions (Conclusions)
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Findings amongst British South Asian Muslims under 30
Years Old at the University of Bradford

Hypothesis
Most young British South
Asian Muslims would
identify with the nation, but
they would be less likely than
white respondents to identify
with the nation

105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified
with the nation; however, 45 (94%) of 48 white British
respondents identified with the nation. Using a significance
level of α .05, a test for the difference in the population
proportions indicates British South Asian Muslims were less
likely than white respondents to identify with the nation (p =
.0026)

Most young British South
Asian Muslims would
identify with the nation, but
their identity as Muslim
would be the more dominant
identity

105 (75%) of 140 British South Asian Muslims identified
with the nation. Of 96 respondents who described
themselves as Muslim and identified with the nation, 58
(60%) subsequently described themselves as Muslim, and 25
(26%) as British or English

Young British South Asian
Muslims would be less likely
than non-Muslims to see
themselves as equal members
of society

112 (81%) of 139 British South Asian Muslims claimed they
thought of themselves as equal members of society,
compared to 45 (93.75%) of 48 White British respondents.
Using a significance level of α .05, a test for the difference
in the population proportions indicates British South Asian
Muslims were less likely than white respondents to feel like
equal members of British society (p = .016). British South
Asian Muslims were also more likely than white respondents
to feel as if they or those of their ethnic or religious
background were discriminated against (p < .0001)

Young British South Asian
Muslims who saw themselves
as equal members of society
would be more likely to
identify with the nation than
those Muslims who saw
themselves as unequal
members of society

89 (79%) of 112 British South Asian Muslims who thought
of themselves as equal members of society identified with
the nation. By contrast, 16 (59%) of 27 British South Asian
Muslims who did not feel like equal members of society
identified with the nation. Using a significance level of α
.05, those who thought they were equal members of society
were more likely to identify with the nation (p = .0142)

While the most common educational goal of British South
Asian Muslim respondents was a religious education
(41/140, 29%), 25 (52%) of 48 White British respondents
favored a liberal education. A chi-square test for
independence demonstrates educational goals are dependent
upon ethnic group (p = .0001)
Table 5-2: Study's Hypotheses (Conclusions)

The educational goals of
young British South Asian
Muslims would differ from
those of the young white
respondents
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Appendices
Appendix A. Major Attacks, Attempted Attacks, and Terror Plots in the UK Involving
British Muslim Immigrants since 2001
Date of
Type of
Attack
Target
Attack
Casualties
Public
56 Killed, including 4 Bombers
7/7/2005
Transportation in
4 x PBIEDs
~700 Injured
London
Public
7/21/2005
Transportation in
5 x PBIEDs
1 Injured
London
Glasgow
1 Killed (Bomber)
6/30/2007
International
1 x VBIED
5 Injured
Airport
MP Stephen
Attempted
5/10/2010
1 Injured (MP Timms)
Timms
Assassination
5/22/2013
British Soldier
Murder
1 Killed (Drummer Lee Rigby)
Date of
Attempted
Attack
12/22/2001
6/29/2007

Target
Transatlantic Flight
Night Clubs in London

Type of Attack
PBIED
2 x VBIEDs

Date Plot
Disrupted

Intended Target
Type of Attack
Sites in the UK and US, including
VBIEDs (Limousines), "Dirty
09/03/2004
NYSE, IMF, World Bank
Bomb"
8/9/2006
10 x Transatlantic Flights
PBIEDs, "Liquid Bombs"
01/31/2007
British Muslim Soldier
Abduction, Murder
US Embassy in London, London
Stock Exchange, and Home of
12/20/2010
IEDs
London Mayor; Mumbai style attack
on Parliament
Civilians in supermarkets and town
11/2011
11 x PBIEDs
centers
4/23/2012
Luton Territorial Army Base
VBIED
English Defense League rally on 30
7/3/2012
IEDs
June 2012 in Dewsbury
Royal Wooten Bassett, British
7/5/2012
IEDs, Assassinations
Security Services
IED: Improvised Explosive Device; PBIED: Person-borne IED;
VBIED: Vehicle-borne IED
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Appendix B. Count of Respondents by Country of Citizenship

Country/Territory
United Kingdom
Other/Not
Identified
India
Nigeria
Pakistan
China
Malaysia
Lithuania
Latvia
Libya
Ireland
United States
Vietnam
Botswana
Eritrea
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Iraq
Kenya
Norway
Oman
Saudi Arabia
Zimbabwe
Australia
Austria

# of
Respondents
359
23

Country/Territory

18
17
17
10
10
7
5
5
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1

Brazil
Denmark
Egypt
France
Gambia
Hong Kong
Iran
Italy
Jordan
Kuwait
Malawi
Mexico
Poland
Portugal
Refugee
Romania
Russia
South Africa
St. Lucia
Tanzania
The Netherlands
Uganda
Zambia
Total

Bangladesh
Belgium

# of
Respondents
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
529
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Appendix C. Responses of All UK Citizens
Q1. Growing up, how much was education stressed in your family?
The question was answered by 355 of the 359 respondents.
Q1: Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your
Family?
A Fair Amount,
134

Very Little, 41

A Lot, 167,
47%

Not at All, 13

a. Q1: By Gender
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?
Not At All
Very Little
A Fair
A Lot
Amount
5
24
78
95
2.48%
11.88%
38.61%
47.03%
8
17
56
72
Female
5.23%
11.11%
36.60%
47.06%
13
41
134
167
Total:
3.66%
11.55%
37.75%
47.04%
Count
Row %
Male

Total
202
153
355
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b. Q1: By Age
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?
Count
Not At All
Very Little
A Fair
A Lot
Row %
Amount
1
6
32
43
16-19 Years
1.22%
7.32%
39.02%
52.44%
Old
7
17
66
87
20-29 Years
3.95%
9.60
37.29%
49.15%
Old
3
5
17
14
30-39 Years
7.69%
12.82%
43.59%
35.90%
Old
2
7
13
13
40-49 Years
5.71%
20.00%
37.14%
37.14
Old
0
6
4
7
50-59 Years
0.00%
35.29%
25.53%
41.18%
Old
0
0
2
3
Over 60
0.00%
0.00%
40.00%
60%
Years Old
13
41
134
167
Total:
3.66%
11.55%
37.75%
47.04%

Total
82
177
39
35
17
5
355

c. Q1: By Ethnicity
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?
Count
Not At All
Very Little
A Fair
A Lot
Row %
Amount
0
4
0
4
Arab/Middle
0.00%
50.00%
0.00%
50.00%
Eastern
8
17
64
107
Asian
4.08%
8.67%
32.65%
54.59
0
1
3
7
Black
0.00%
9.09%
27.27%
63.64%
0
1
4
6
Mixed
0.00%
9.09%
36.36%
54.55%
1
0
1
1
Other
33.33%
0.00%
33.33%
33.33%
4
18
62
42
White
3.17%
14.29%
49.21%
33.33%
13
41
134
167
Total:
3.66%
11.55%
37.75%
47.04%

Total
8
196
11
11
3
126
355
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d. Q1: By Religion
Growing Up, How Much Was Education Stressed in Your Family?
Count
A Fair
Not At All
Very Little
A Lot
Row %
Amount
0
0
0
1
Buddhist
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100%
2
13
30
26
Christian
2.82%
18.31%
42.25%
36.62%
1
3
5
12
Hindu
4.76%
14.29%
23.81%
57.14%
6
18
63
103
Muslim
3.16%
9.47%
33.16%
54.21%
0
0
1
2
Sikh
0.00%
0.00%
33.33%
66.67%
2
1
3
2
Other
25.00%
12.50%
37.50%
25.00%
2
6
32
21
No Religion
3.28%
9.84%
52.46%
34.43%
13
41
134
167
Total:
3.66%
11.55%
37.75%
47.04%

Total
1
71
21
190
3
8
61
355

Q2. How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet,
plan to stress education to them?
The question was answered by 348 of the 359 respondents.
Q2: How much do you stress education to your
children?
I Don't Plan
to Have
Children, 18 Not at All, 6
Very Little, 7

A Lot, 215

A Fair
Amount, 102
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a. Q2: By Gender
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet,
plan to stress education to them?
Count
I Don't Plan
A Fair
Row %
Not At All Very Little
A Lot
to Have
Total
Amount
Children
0
2
59
129
7
197
Male
0.00%
1.02%
29.95%
65.48%
3.55%
6
5
43
86
11
151
Female
3.97%
3.31%
28.48%
56.95%
7.28%
6
7
102
215
18
348
Total:
1.72%
2.01%
29.31%
61.78%
5.17%

b. Q2: By Age
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet,
plan to stress education to them?
Count
I Don't Plan
A Fair
Row %
Not At All Very Little
A Lot
to Have
Total
Amount
Children
1
1
26
50
3
16-19
81
1.23%
1.23%
32.10%
61.73%
3.70%
Years Old
3
3
56
107
2
20-29
171
1.75%
1.75%
32.75%
62.57%
1.17%
Years Old
0
1
9
24
5
30-39
39
0.00
2.56%
23.08%
61.54%
12.82%
Years Old
1
2
6
19
6
40-49
34
2.94%
5.88%
17.65%
55.88%
17.65%
Years Old
1
0
4
11
2
50-59
17
5.56%
0.00
22.22%
61.11%
11.11%
Years Old
0
0
1
4
0
Over 60
5
0.00%
0.00%
20.00%
80.00%
0.00
Years Old
6
7
102
215
18
348
Total:
1.72%
2.01%
29.31%
61.78%
5.17%
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c. Q2: By Ethnicity
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet,
plan to stress education to them?
Count
I Don't Plan
A Fair
Row %
Not At All Very Little
A Lot
to Have
Total
Amount
Children
0
0
2
4
1
Arab/Middle
7
0.00%
0.00%
28.57%
57.14%
14.29%
Eastern
5
6
56
124
2
193
Asian
2.59%
3.11%
29.02%
64.25%
1.04%
0
0
2
8
0
10
Black
0.00%
0.00%
20.00%
80.00%
0.00%
0
0
2
7
1
10
Mixed
0.00%
0.00%
20.00%
70.00%
10.00%
0
1
0
1
1
3
Other
0.00%
33.33%
0.00%
33.33%
33.33%
1
0
40
71
13
125
White
.80%
0.00%
32.00%
56.80%
10.40%
6
7
102
215
18
348
Total:
1.72%
2.01%
29.31%
61.78%
5.17%
d. Q2: By Religion
How much do you stress education to your children, or if you don't have children yet,
plan to stress education to them?
Count
I Don't Plan
A Fair
Row %
Not At All Very Little
A Lot
to Have
Total
Amount
Children
0
0
0
1
0
1
Buddhist
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
0.00%
1
0
17
48
4
70
Christian
1.43%
0.00%
24.29%
68.57%
5.71%
1
3
6
11
0
21
Hindu
4.76%
14.29%
28.57%
52.38%
0.00%
4
3
54
120
3
184
Muslim
2.17%
1.63%
29.35%
65.22%
1.63%
0
0
1
2
0
3
Sikh
0.00%
0.00%
33.33%
66.67%
0.00%
0
1
3
2
2
8
Other
0.00%
12.50%
37.50%
25.00%
25.00%
0
0
21
31
9
61
No Religion
0.00%
0.00%
34.43%
50.82%
14.75%
6
7
102
215
18
348
Total:
1.72%
2.01%
29.31%
61.78%
5.17%
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Q3. The chart below describes 5 different educational goals, which educational goal is the
most important to you?
Basic Education:
Religious Education:
Liberal Education:
Vocational Education:
Civic Education:

One that provides students with basic reading skills and basic math
skills
One that provides students with strong values and strong religious
beliefs
One that teaches students how to solve problems and think for
themselves
One that prepares students to find a good job
One that makes sure every student becomes a good citizen and
shows respect for the laws of his/her country

The question was answered by 356 of the 359 respondents.
Q3: Which Educational Goal is the Most Important to You?

Civic
Education, 59

Vocational
Education, 73

Basic
Education, 44
Religious
Education, 60

Liberal
Education, 120

a. Q3: By Gender
Count
Row %
Male
Female
Total:

Which educational goal is the most important to you?
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocational
Civic
Education
Education
Education
Education
Education
29
38
68
37
31
14.29%
18.72%
33.50%
18.23%
15.27%
15
22
52
36
28
9.80%
14.38%
33.99%
23.53%
18.30%
44
60
120
73
59
12.36%
16.85%
33.71%
20.51%
16.57%

Total
203
153
356
161

b. Q3: By Age
Count
Row %
16-19
Years Old
20-29
Years Old
30-39
Years Old
40-49
Years Old
50-59
Years Old
Over 60
Years Old
Total:

Which educational goal is the most important to you?
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocational
Civic
Education
Education
Education
Education
Education
12
13
24
19
13
14.81%
16.05%
29.63%
23.46%
16.05%
16
40
54
38
31
8.94%
22.35%
30.17%
21.23%
17.32%
7
3
14
6
9
17.95%
7.69%
35.90%
15.38%
23.08%
3
1
24
5
2
8.57%
2.86%
68.57%
14.29%
5.71%
5
3
4
3
3
27.78%
16.67%
22.22%
16.67%
16.67%
1
0
0
2
1
25.00%
0.00%
0.00%
50.00%
25.00%
44
60
120
73
59
12.36%
16.85%
33.71%
20.51%
16.57%

Total
81
179
39
35
18
4
356

c. Q3: By Ethnicity
Count
Row %
Arab/Middl
e Eastern
Asian
Black
Mixed
Other
White
Total:

Which educational goal is the most important to you?
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocational
Civic
Education
Education
Education
Education
Education
2
0
1
1
3
28.57%
0.00%
14.29%
14.29%
42.86%
22
51
47
38
39
11.17%
25.89%
23.86%
19.29%
19.80%
1
2
4
2
2
9.09%
18.18%
36.36%
18.18%
18.18%
1
0
8
1
1
9.09%
0.00%
72.73%
9.09%
9.09%
1
0
0
0
2
33.33%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
66.67%
17
7
60
31
12
13.39%
5.51%
47.24%
24.41%
9.45%
44
60
120
73
59
12.36%
16.85%
33.71%
20.51%
16.57%

Total
7
197
11
11
3
127
356
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d. Q3: By Religion
Count
Row %
Buddhist
Christian
Hindu
Muslim
Sikh
Other
No
Religion
Total:

Which educational goal is the most important to you?
Basic
Religious
Liberal
Vocational
Civic
Education
Education
Education
Education
Education
0
0
1
0
0
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
0.00%
0.00%
10
7
21
23
10
14.08%
9.86%
29.58%
32.39%
14.08%
4
2
6
3
5
20.00%
10.00%
30.00%
15.00%
25.00%
23
51
45
34
38
12.04%
26.70%
23.56%
17.80%
19.90%
1
0
1
1
0
33.33%
0.00%
33.33%
33.33%
0.00%
0
0
4
3
1
0.00%
0.00%
50.00%
37.50%
12.50%
6
0
42
9
5
9.68%
0.00%
67.74%
14.52%
8.06%
44
60
120
73
59
12.36%
16.85%
33.71%
20.51%
16.57%

Total
1
71
20
191
3
8
62
356

Q4. Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type of education that is most
important to you?
The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents.
Q4: Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the type
of education that is most important to you?

No, 37

Yes, 318
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a. Q4: By Gender
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the
type of education that is most important to you?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
177
25
202
Male
87.62%
12.38%
141
12
153
Female
92.16%
7.84%
318
37
355
Total:
89.58%
10.42%

b. Q4: By Age
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the
type of education that is most important to you?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
73
8
16-19 Years
81
90.12%
9.88%
Old
163
16
20-29 Years
179
91.06%
8.94%
Old
30
8
30-39 Years
38
78.95%
21.05%
Old
32
2
40-49 Years
34
94.12%
5.88%
Old
16
2
50-59 Years
18
88.89%
11.11%
Old
4
1
Over 60
5
80.00%
20.00%
Years Old
318
37
355
Total:
89.58%
10.42%
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Q4: By Ethnicity
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the
type of education that is most important to you?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
8
0
8
Arab/Middle
100.00%
0.00%
Eastern
177
18
195
Asian
90.77%
9.23%
11
0
11
Black
100.00%
0.00%
10
1
11
Mixed
90.91%
9.09%
2
1
3
Other
66.67%
33.33%
110
17
127
White
86.61%
13.39%
318
37
355
Total:
89.58%
10.42%

d.Q4: By Religion
Do you feel as if you are/were able to achieve the
type of education that is most important to you?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
1
0
1
Buddhist
100.00%
0.00%
62
9
71
Christian
87.32%
12.68%
20
0
20
Hindu
100.00%
0.00%
171
19
190
Muslim
90.00%
10.00%
3
0
3
Sikh
100.00%
0.00%
4
4
8
Other
50.00%
50.00%
57
5
62
No Religion
91.94%
8.06%
318
37
355
Total:
89.58%
10.42%
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Q5. Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to education as anybody else in the
country?
The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents.
Q5: Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to
education as anybody else in the country?

No, 59

Yes, 296

a. Q5: By Gender
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to
education as anybody else in the country?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
162
40
202
Male
80.20%
19.80
134
19
153
Female
87.58%
12.42%
296
59
355
Total:
83.39%
16.62%
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b. Q5: By Age
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to
education as anybody else in the country?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
67
14
16-19 Years
81
82.72%
17.28%
Old
153
26
20-29 Years
179
85.47%
14.53%
Old
32
6
30-39 Years
38
84.21%
15.79%
Old
26
8
40-49 Years
34
76.47%
25.53%
Old
14
4
50-59 Years
18
77.78%
22.22%
Old
4
1
Over 60
5
80.00%
20.00%
Years Old
296
59
355
Total:
83.38%
16.62%

c. Q5: By Ethnicity
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to
education as anybody else in the country?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
4
4
Arab/Middle
8
50.00%
50.00%
Eastern
168
27
195
Asian
86.15%
13.85%
8
3
11
Black
72.73%
27.27%
10
1
11
Mixed
90.91%
9.09%
1
2
3
Other
33.33%
66.67%
105
22
127
White
82.68%
17.32%
296
59
355
Total:
83.38%
16.62%
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d. Q5: By Religion
Do you feel as if you have/had as much access to
education as anybody else in the country?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
1
0
1
Buddhist
100.00%
0.00%
56
15
71
Christian
78.87%
21.13%
18
2
20
Hindu
90.00%
10.00%
158
32
190
Muslim
83.16%
16.84%
3
0
3
Sikh
100.00%
0.00%
6
2
8
Other
75.00%
25.00%
54
8
62
No Religion
87.10%
12.90%
296
59
355
Total:
83.38%
16.62%

Q6. How much access to education do most people of your ethnic background have?
The question was answered by 358 of 359 respondents.
Q6: How much access to education do most people of your
ethnic background have?

Same Access,
238
Less Access,
79
More Access,
41
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a. Q6: By Gender
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic
background have?
Count
Less
More
Same
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
45
28
131
204
Male
22.06%
13.73%
64.22%
34
13
107
154
Female
22.08%
8.44%
69.48%
79
41
238
358
Total:
22.07%
11.45%
66.48%

b. Q6: By Age
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic
background have?
Count
Less
More
Same
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
24
7
52
16-19 Years
83
28.92%
8.43%
62.65%
Old
44
18
117
20-29 Years
179
22.58%
10.06%
65.36%
Old
6
6
27
30-39 Years
39
15.38%
15.38%
69.23%
Old
4
7
23
40-49 Years
34
11.76%
20.59%
67.65%
Old
1
3
14
50-59 Years
18
5.56%
16.67%
77.78%
Old
0
0
5
Over 60
5
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
Years Old
79
41
238
358
Total:
22.07%
11.45%
66.48%
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c. Q6: By Ethnicity
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic
background have?
Count
Less
More
Same
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
3
0
5
Arab/Middle
8
37.50%
0.00%
62.50%
Eastern
61
16
121
198
Asian
30.81%
8.08%
61.11%
6
0
5
11
Black
54.55%
0.00
45.45%
4
1
6
11
Mixed
36.36%
9.09%
54.55%
1
2
0
3
Other
33.33%
66.67%
0.00%
4
22
101
127
White
3.15%
17.32%
79.53%
79
41
238
358
Total:
22.07%
11.45%
66.48%

d. Q6: By Religion
How much access to education do most people of your ethnic
background have?
Count
Less
More
Same
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
0
0
1
1
Buddhist
0.00%
0.00%
100.00%
5
8
58
71
Christian
7.04%
11.27%
81.69%
3
4
14
21
Hindu
14.29%
19.05%
66.67%
63
13
116
192
Muslim
32.81%
6.77%
60.42%
1
2
0
3
Sikh
33.33%
66.67%
0.00%
1
2
5
8
Other
12.50%
25.00%
62.50%
6
12
44
62
No Religion
9.68%
19.35%
70.97%
79
41
238
358
Total:
22.07%
11.45%
66.48%
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Q7. How much access to education do most people of your religious affiliation have?
The question was answered by 357 of 359 respondents.
Q7: How much access to education do most people of your
religious affiliation have?

N/A, 16
Same Access,
259

Less Access,
58

More Access,
24

a. Q7: By Gender
How much access to education do most people of your religious
affiliation have?
Count
Less
More
Same
N/A
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
39
13
145
6
203
Male
19.21%
6.40%
71.43% 2.96%
19
11
114
10
154
Female
12.34%
7.14%
74.03% 6.49%
58
24
259
16
357
Total:
16.25%
6.72%
72.55% 4.48%
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b. Q7: By Age
How much access to education do most people of your religious
affiliation have?
Count
Less
More
Same
N/A
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
17
7
56
3
16-19 Years
83
20.48%
8.43%
67.47% 3.61%
Old
33
13
130
2
20-29 Years
178
18.54%
7.30%
73.03% 1.12%
Old
4
1
29
5
30-39 Years
39
10.26%
2.56%
74.36%
12.82%
Old
2
2
25
5
40-49 Years
34
5.88%
5.88%
73.53% 14.71%
Old
1
1
15
1
50-59 Years
18
5.56%
5.56%
83.33% 5.56%
Old
1
0
4
0
Over 60
5
20.00%
0.00%
80.00% 0.00%
Years Old
58
24
259
16
357
Total:
16.25%
6.72%
72.55% 4.48%

c. Q7: By Ethnicity
How much access to education do most people of your religious
affiliation have?
Count
Less
More
Same
N/A
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
2
0
6
0
Arab/Middle
8
25.00%
0.00%
75.00% 0.00%
Eastern
51
14
132
0
197
Asian
25.89%
7.11%
67.01% 0.00%
1
1
9
0
11
Black
9.09%
9.09%
81.82% 0.00%
1
2
7
1
11
Mixed
9.09%
18.18%
63.64% 9.09%
1
1
1
0
3
Other
33.33%
33.33%
33.33% 0.00%
2
6
104
15
127
White
1.57%
4.72%
81.89% 11.81%
58
24
259
16
357
Total:
16.25%
6.72%
75.55% 4.48%
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d. Q7: By Religion
How much access to education do most people of your religious
affiliation have?
Count
Less
More
Same
N/A
Total
Row %
Access
Access
Access
0
0
1
0
1
Buddhist
0.00%
0.00%
100.00% 0.00%
2
4
65
0
71
Christian
2.82%
5.63%
91.55% 0.00%
4
2
15
0
21
Hindu
19.05%
9.52%
71.43% 0.00%
50
12
129
0
191
Muslim
26.18%
6.28%
67.54% 0.00%
1
1
1
0
3
Sikh
33.33%
33.33%
33.33% 0.00%
0
1
6
1
8
Other
0.00%
12.50%
75.00% 12.50%
1
4
42
15
62
No Religion
1.61%
6.45%
67.74% 24.19%
58
24
259
16
357
Total:
16.25%
6.72%
72.55% 4.48%

Q8. Do you personally feel that you are a part of British society?
The question was answered by 355 of 359 respondents.
Q8: Do you personally feel that you are a part of British
society?
No, 19

Yes, 336
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a. Q8: By Gender
Do you personally feel that you are a part of
British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
192
11
203
Male
94.58%
5.42%
144
8
152
Female
94.74%
5.26%
336
19
355
Total:
94.65%
5.35%

b. Q8: By Age
Do you personally feel that you are a part of
British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
75
7
16-19 Years
82
91.46%
8.54%
Old
170
9
20-29 Years
179
94.97%
5.03%
Old
36
2
30-39 Years
38
94.74%
5.26%
Old
32
1
40-49 Years
33
96.97%
3.03%
Old
18
0
50-59 Years
18
100.00%
0.00%
Old
5
0
Over 60
5
100.00%
0.00%
Years Old
336
19
355
Total:
94.65%
5.35%
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c. Q8: By Ethnicity
Do you personally feel that you are a part of
British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
6
2
Arab/Middle
8
75.00%
25.00%
Eastern
188
10
198
Asian
94.95%
5.05%
8
1
9
Black
88.89%
11.11%
9
2
11
Mixed
81.82%
18.18%
3
0
3
Other
100.00%
0.00%
122
4
126
White
96.83%
3.17%
336
19
355
Total:
94.65%
5.35%

d. Q8: By Religion
Do you personally feel that you are a part of
British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
1
0
1
Buddhist
100.00%
0.00%
67
3
70
Christian
95.71%
4.29%
18
1
19
Hindu
94.74%
5.26%
180
13
193
Muslim
93.26%
6.74%
3
0
3
Sikh
100.00%
0.00%
7
0
7
Other
100.00%
0.00%
60
2
62
No Religion
96.77%
3.23%
336
19
355
Total:
94.65%
5.35%
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Q9. Do you personally feel that you are an equal member of British society?
The question was answered by 353 of 359 respondents.
Q9: Do you personally feel that you are an equal
member of British society?
No, 61

Yes, 292

a. Q9: By Gender
Do you personally feel that you are an equal
member of British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
165
37
202
Male
81.68%
18.32%
127
24
151
Female
84.11%
15.89%
292
61
353
Total:
82.72%
17.28%
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b. Q9: By Age
Do you personally feel that you are an equal
member of British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
68
14
16-19 Years
82
82.93%
17.07%
Old
154
24
20-29 Years
178
86.52%
13.48%
Old
31
7
30-39 Years
38
81.58%
18.42%
Old
22
11
40-49 Years
33
66.67%
33.33%
Old
14
3
50-59 Years
17
82.35%
17.65%
Old
3
2
Over 60
5
60.00%
40.00%
Years Old
292
61
353
Total:
82.72%
17.28%

c. Q9: By Ethnicity
Do you personally feel that you are an equal
member of British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
5
3
Arab/Middle
8
62.50%
37.50%
Eastern
164
34
198
Asian
82.83%
17.17%
6
3
9
Black
66.67%
33.33%
9
2
11
Mixed
81.82%
18.18%
0
3
3
Other
0.00%
100.00%
108
16
124
White
87.10%
12.90%
292
61
353
Total:
87.72%
17.28%
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d. Q9: By Religion
Do you personally feel that you are an equal
member of British society?
Count
Yes
No
Total
Row %
1
0
1
Buddhist
100.00%
0.00%
59
10
69
Christian
85.51%
14.49%
17
3
20
Hindu
85.00%
15.00%
156
36
192
Muslim
81.25%
18.75%
3
0
3
Sikh
100.00%
0.00%
5
2
7
Other
71.43%
28.57%
51
10
61
No Religion
83.61%
16.39%
292
61
353
Total:
87.72%
17.28%
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